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Tort Law Inside Out
A B ST R AC T. For more than a century, scholars have been looking at tort law from the outside
in. Theorists committed to external goals like efficient allocation of resources or moral justice
have treated tort as a mere vehicle for the achievement of their policy preferences, rather than as a
body of law with a discernible internal purpose. It is time to revisit tort on its own terms.
This Article takes its cue from the New Doctrinalists, who urge that extralegal normative
insights from fields such as economics or philosophy aid adjudication only when they are directly
tethered to legal concepts; that is, to doctrine. Scrutinizing tort doctrine yields a surprising in-
sight: tort law is not primarily concerned with efficiency or morality, as the instrumentalists have
long contended, but with community. A linguistic study of the Restatement of Torts reveals that
doctrine alludes to community more frequently and more comprehensively than it does to any
other justificatory concept. Specifically, throughout the Restatement's discussion of negligence,
strict liability, and intentional wrongs, doctrine disfavors stating interpersonal duties in positive
terms, preferring to let them float with community values. Consequently, tort operates as a vehi-
cle through which communities perpetually reexamine and communicate their values, encourag-
ing individuals to coordinate private relationships without undue state involvement.
Tort law's stated goal is to construct community. Moreover, tort doctrine acknowledges that
two distinct kinds of community - closed and open - can generate the values that govern resolu-
tion of interpersonal disputes. Accordingly, tort doctrine embeds a choice between the morality
norms of traditional, closed communities and the efficiency norms of the modern, open commu-
nity, depending on whether the dispute is local or national in scope. So a descriptive account of
tort doctrine suggests that morality and efficiency are not mutually exclusive theories of tort, but
rather complementary manifestations of tort law's broader community-constructing purpose. A
survey of American tort cases confirms that courts have intuitively been fluctuating between local
morality norms and national efficiency norms for decades, without fully acknowledging or op-
erationalizing this practice.
Pivoting from theory to practice, the Article suggests that tort law should embrace and re-
fine its ability to toggle between local morality and national efficiency. The Article briefly sketch-
es how the toggle would operate to adjudicate select hot-button issues arising within each type of
tort liability: battery (intentional tort), youth football (strict liability), and failure to vaccinate
(negligence). On each of these topics, group norms - and therefore liability - would be expected
to vary within adjudicative communities. Making this normative toggle explicit would both en-
hance the internal integrity of tort law and improve tort law's external standing relative to other
bodies of law such as the Constitution or federal statutes. Moreover, the Article concludes, un-
derstanding tort liability as an expression of particular community values might prevent the con-
stitutional override of injury verdicts arising from protected behavior such as gun ownership or
speech.
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INTRODUCTION
For more than a century, scholars have been looking at tort law from the
outside in. Theorists committed to external goals like efficient allocation of re-
sources or moral justice have treated tort law as a mere vehicle for the achieve-
ment of their policy preferences, rather than as a body of law with a discernible
internal purpose. It is time to revisit tort on its own terms.
This Article takes its cue from the New Doctrinalists,' who urge that extra-
legal normative insights from fields such as economics or philosophy aid adju-
dication only when they are directly tethered to legal concepts-that is, to doc-
trine. Scrutinizing tort doctrine yields a surprising insight: tort law is not
primarily concerned with efficiency or morality, as the instrumentalists have
long contended, but with community. A linguistic study of the Restatement of
Torts reveals that doctrine alludes to the concept of community more frequently
and more comprehensively than it does to any other justificatory concept. Spe-
cifically, throughout the Restatement's discussion of negligence, strict liability,
and intentional wrongs, doctrine disfavors stating interpersonal duties in posi-
tive terms, preferring to let them float with community values. Consequently,
tort law operates as a vehicle through which communities perpetually reex-
amine and communicate their values, encouraging individuals to coordinate
private relationships without undue state involvement. In short, the goal of tort
law is to construct community.
Tort doctrine acknowledges that two distinct kinds of community -closed
and open -can generate the values that govern resolution of interpersonal dis-
putes. Accordingly, tort doctrine embeds a choice between the morality norms
of traditional, closed communities and the efficiency norms of the modern,
open community, depending on whether the dispute is local or national in
scope. Thus, a descriptive account of tort doctrine suggests that morality and
efficiency are not mutually exclusive theories of tort, but rather complementary
manifestations of tort law's broader community-constructing purpose. Fur-
thermore, as a prescriptive matter, this Article suggests that tort should em-
brace and refine its ability to toggle between local morality and national effi-
ciency. Making this normative toggle explicit would enhance the internal
integrity of tort and improve its external standing relative to other bodies of
law such as the Constitution or federal statutes.
Part I of this Article rehearses the history of tort theory in the United
States, situating its evolution within the wider academic tension between doc-
trinal formalism and Legal Realism. Broadly speaking, tort theory has split into
1. See infra text accompanying notes 76-82.
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two camps: economists view tort as a method of encouraging efficient private
behavior, while philosophers and political scientists view it as a method of
achieving a kind of moral justice. These schools of thought are antagonistic and
each levels an effective critique against the other. Part I then shifts from exter-
nal accounts of tort by these disciplines to an internal view of the law itself, as
represented by standard tort doctrine. The Part demonstrates that doctrine is
less concerned with efficiency or morality than it is with the concept of com-
munity.
Part II unpacks the concept of community. First, it distinguishes between
political and sociological versions of community. It demonstrates that while
public law "communities" are political organizations, the private law tort com-
munity is a sociological organization. It summarizes the devices that sociologi-
cal communities use to develop and maintain relational norms, and shows how
those devices are replicated within the operation of tort. Further, it explains
that sociological community can organize itself in either a closed, traditional
configuration or an open, modern configuration, and that both types of socio-
logical community can be nested within a single political community. It
demonstrates that at the founding, the United States comprised multiple closed
communities, whereas by the end of the nineteenth century a unitary open
community had been forged atop those many local groups.
Part III shows that, as a descriptive matter, the primary goal of tort doctrine
is community construction. Tort has historically served as a means of deter-
mining community norms, encouraging observance of those norms to enhance
private cooperation, and stigmatizing those who deviate. During the colonial
and antebellum periods, most private interpersonal disputes were restricted to
closed communities whose values tended to arise from a shared morality that
could provide the liability referent in nominate, strict liability, and negligence
causes of action. As the nature of American community evolved to comprise
both traditional, closed communities and a modern, open community, courts
consciously adapted two key tort doctrines, the privity requirement and the
equation of custom and reason, enabling tort to draw liability-determining val-
ues from the open community when a dispute arose between remote parties or
from the closed community when a dispute arose at that level. As a result,
courts in the modern period began to move fluidly, drawing liability norms
from either the closed or the open community depending on the particulars of
the case at hand. Part III suggests that tort doctrine's reliance on community as
the source of norms for open-textured liability elements implicitly encourages
decision makers to toggle between traditional and modern values-between
morality and efficiency. Finally, Part III concludes that tort doctrine has not ex-
plicitly acknowledged the capacity to toggle between communities or between
norms. Thus, as a prescriptive matter, it argues that acknowledging tort law's
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capacity to toggle would clarify the basis of tort liability in individual cases and
would reconcile the theoretical impasse between morality theorists and effi-
ciency theorists.
Part IV illustrates how the task of assigning interpersonal liability would be
improved by making tort law's historically implicit use of distinct community
norms explicit. Using as examples the intentional tort of battery, strict liability
for child football injuries, and negligence liability for failure to vaccinate, Part
IV demonstrates how tort could impose liability to do "justice" in local disputes
and to achieve "utility" in national ones.
Part V sketches how a bifurcated community theory of tort might influence
tort law's standing vis-A-vis other bodies of law. First, it proposes that when
the Constitution appears to insulate behavior that might otherwise be consid-
ered tortious - such as revenge porn or careless gun storage - fixing the com-
munity scope of a damage verdict might reduce the need for a robust constitu-
tional override. Second, it suggests that obstacle preemption analysis -
governing conflicts between federal regulation and state tort verdicts -would
unfold more coherently if courts could better calibrate the community scope of
the verdict under review.
I. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TORT LIABILITY
Tort law is one of the oldest bodies of law.2 For centuries, tort law's purpose
was thought to be "corrective justice" - identifying "wrongdoers" obliged to re-
turn victims to a pre-injury position.' But in the mid-nineteenth century, many
American judges and tort theorists began to describe this theory as overtly
moral and therefore incompatible with a liberal democracy designed to ensure
fairness rather than goodness.' As Legal Realism introduced the idea that judg-
es giving lip service to doctrinal rules were in fact motivated by extralegal con-
cerns, some scholars concluded that tort was better understood as an instru-
mental scheme designed to achieve social policy goals.5 Ultimately, the policy
2. See, e.g., M. Stuart Madden, The Cultural Evolution of Tort Law, 37 ARIz. ST. L.J. 831, 831-34
(2005) (tracing the roots of modern tort law to the norms and customs of ancient and
primitive cultures); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to
Law, 23 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 42-44 (1980) (describing the function of private tort law in deterring
interpersonal friction in primitive societies).
3. See, e.g., John Fabian Witt, Contingency, Immanence, and Inevitability in the Law of Accidents, 1
J. ToRT L. 1, 12-13 (2007); see also infra notes 8-1o and accompanying text (identifying the
Aristotelian roots of corrective justice).
4. See infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
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goal that emerged as the favorite of twentieth-century tort theorists was the
optimal allocation of accident costs to incentivize care without discouraging so-
cially useful activities.' Although this efficiency view of tort has moved into the
mainstream, it has not displaced entirely the earlier understanding of tort. In
fact, American tort theorists today are "split between two competing concep-
tions of tort liability. One conception is economic; the other, for lack of a better
word, is moral."'
A. A Brief History of Tort Theory
Explanations for tort liability dating back to Aristotle have referred to its
"distinctive moral structure."' The idea that individuals were entitled not to be
harmed by their fellows, and that the doing of harm triggered in the doer an
obligation to compensate, was termed by Aristotle "corrective justice."9 The
concern of tort law and the basis for the imposition of liability was the moral
relationship that arose from the "doing and suffering of harm.""o Unsurprising-
ly, then, some of the early tort causes of action were for the most overt doing of
harm, through intentional behavior that directly violated the sufferer's right to
bodily integrity, such as battery."
In the late nineteenth century, Oliver Wendell Holmes challenged the tradi-
tional view of torts, observing that this area of the law was better understood as
a means to achieve social policy ends attenuated from individual integrity or
notions of morality.' 2 He proposed that injurers should not be held liable in tort
on the theory that any infliction of harm was immoral, but instead that liability
should attach only if the injurer's actions were "unreasonable," with "reasona-
bleness" being the product of an external standard derived from social need.' 3
Not all of Holmes's contemporaries agreed with his new paradigm. For exam-
6. See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
7. Gregory C. Keating, Strict Liability Wrongs,. in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 292, 292 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014).
8. Ernest Weinrib, The Special Morality of Tort Law, 34 McGILL L.J. 403, 410 (1989).
9. Id. at 410-11 (citing 5 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS §§ 2-4 (c. 350 B.C.E.)).
io. Id. at 411.
II. See, e.g., Madden, supra note 2, at 832 (identifying one of the earliest justifications of tort
liability as a response to the wrongful act of battery).
12. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 135, 161-62 (Boston, Little,
Brown & Co. 1881).
13. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA.
L. REv. 1733, 1756-57 (1998).
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ple, James Barr Ames argued explicitly that tort liability was premised on find-
ing the defendant's behavior morally blameworthy." Holmes's suggestion
gained ground, however, in the early twentieth century. In particular, William
Prosser took up the Holmesian mantle in his 1941 treatise on torts, describing
tort as a body of law that held individuals to an objective standard of reasona-
ble behavior towards others. 5
Notably, this evolving approach to the purpose of imposing tort liability
played out against the backdrop of a broader movement within the legal acad-
emy. In the 1930s, American Legal Realists began to observe that the actual
outcomes of lawsuits were often driven not by formal doctrine but by judicial
impressions about the social needs presented by the specific facts of the case
before them."6 Put broadly, theorists suggested that courts both did and should
go beyond the formal rules bequeathed to them by previous generations to de-
cide cases in a way that would serve the present and the future." Legal realism
was the product of "intellectual ferment in the early twentieth century"" and
was associated with "creative impulses" that would bring a "wholly 'fresh per-
spective"' to legal practice."
Applying these Legal Realist arguments to the Holmesian tort paradigm led
many scholars to investigate how doctrine could best capture public policy
14. See, e.g., James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARv. L. REv. 97, 99-100 (1908) (noting that
"the ethical quality of the defendant's act has become the measure of his liability instead of
the mere physical act regardless of the motive or fault of the actor"). Interestingly, the shift
that Holmes advocated from strict liability to "fault" liability has since been described by
some theorists as actually introducing moral concepts into an area of the law previously im-
mune to them. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 84 HARv. L.
REV. 537, 564-66 (1972). Considered broadly, it is easy to see how the very suggestion that
liability should not follow automatically from the doing of an act introduces the possibility
of moral reasoning to determine when liability is appropriate. But Holmes himself disa-
vowed the role of morality in this determination and implied that strict liability for injuring
acts was itself premised on a morally infused deference to the primacy of the individual. See
HOLMES, supra note 12, at 162.
15. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 13, at 1757.
16. See Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Doctrine, 163 U. PA. L. REv. 1975, 1976-78 (2015).
17. Notably, however, judges have not abandoned at least their superficial commitment to doc-
trine. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Constraint of Legal Doctrine, 163 U. PA. L. REV.
1843, 1845 (2015) (citing Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What is Legal Doctrine?, 1oo
Nw. U. L. REV. 517, 517 (20o6)). Realists dismissed doctrine as overly concerned with formal
categories and arbitrary rules that bear no relationship to the reality of the social forces driv-
ing the legal system or the lives of those seeking its assistance. See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 16,
at 1977.
18. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAw IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 64 (2003).
ig. Id. at 64, 74.
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goals.20 Starting in the 1970s, Guido Calabresi suggested that as a normative
matter, tort doctrine should aim to reduce the cost of accidents by shifting lia-
bility to the least cost avoider.2 ' Calabresi's tort theory "[took] strict liability to
be the fundamental principle of tort law."22 A decade later, William M. Landes
and Richard A. Posner argued that as a descriptive matter, notwithstanding
their stated goals, the effect of many tort doctrines was to assign liability in a
way that incentivized the efficient allocation of resources.2 3 Posner's tort theory
"[took] negligence to be the fundamental principle of tort law."24 For the re-
mainder of the twentieth century, theoretical momentum gathered behind the
notion that tort was a means of regulating social behavior based on any of a
menu of resource-allocation commitments.25
Despite the profound influence of law and economics theory on tort, it did
not entirely wipe out the view that the purpose of tort liability was to render a
kind of wrongs-based justice. Some theorists pushed back on the efficiency
view contemporaneously, suggesting that it had obscured "precisely those
questions that make tort law a unique repository of intuitions of corrective jus-
tice."2 6 This position gained traction in the 199os, with Ernest Weinrib, Jules
20. Id. at 76-77 (discussing LEON GREEN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORT CASES (1931)).
21. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: ALEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26 (1970); see
also Richard A. Posner, Instrumental and Noninstrumental Theories of Tort Law, 88 IND. L.J.
469, 470 (2013); Michael L. Rustad, Twenty-First-Century Tort Theories: The Internal-
ist/Externalist Debate, 88 IND. L.J. 419, 438-39 (2013).
22. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Richard Epstein and the Cold War in Torts, 3 J. TORT L. 5 (2010).
23. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAw
(1987).
24. Zipursky, supra note 22, at i.
25. John Goldberg has grouped under this general umbrella the compensation-deterrence camp
(those who, like Holmes and Prosser, take the purpose of tort to be the deterrence of antiso-
cial behavior and compensation for those injured by it); the enterprise liability camp (those
who see tort as a body of law that can function to provide large-scale social relief for accident
victims, including Fleming James, Robert Keeton, and Jeffrey O'Connell); and the economic
deterrence camp (including law and economics theorists like Landes, Posner, and Calabre-
si). See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 521-60 (2003). A
fourth group of scholars, namely social justice theorists such as Ralph Nader and Michael
Rustad, are comfortable with the notion of tort as an instrument of social engineering, but
advocate that it work toward a goal of limiting expansive corporate power and investing the
general public with more robust rights. Id. at 560-63. And libertarian theorists, such as
Richard Epstein, suggest that individuals are fully entitled to all the goods they can acquire
but responsible for all the harms they inflict. Id. at 564-67.
26. Fletcher, supra note 14, at 538; see also Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 151, 160, 203-04 (1973) (arguing that tort should hold actors accountable for
whatever harms they cause even if the harms resulted from reasonable behavior).
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Coleman, and Stephen Perry thoughtfully suggesting that corrective justice,
rather than economic efficiency, remained the appropriate justification for im-
posing on tortfeasors a duty of compensation or repair. For example, Weinrib
argued that tort (and private law generally) is an exercise in moral practice.27
Coleman acknowledged the significance of the market as a mechanism for sta-
bilizing society but contended that it was best sustained by contract law, leav-
ing tort the body of law concerned with repairing wrongful losses.28 Perry, too,
argued for a morally grounded obligation to repair injuries inflicted on oth-
ers. 29 John Goldberg has described all of these scholars as individual justice
theorists intent on returning to the pre-Holmesian era by reconnecting tort "to
the doing of justice between the parties to the litigation."o
Goldberg himself, along with co-author Benjamin Zipursky, more recently
entered the individual justice canon by introducing the "civil recourse" theory
of tort."1 Civil recourse theory relies on some of the same intuitions as correc-
tive justice. It differs, however, by suggesting that tort law's purpose is not to
saddle wrongdoers with an obligation to repair, but instead to privilege wrong
sufferers with an autonomous right of recourse.32 More than just a difference in
nuance, this unique position says that tort law is less concerned with correcting
losses for correction's sake and more concerned with correcting losses as a
mechanism for reasserting the relational equality between the injurer and the
injured. What corrective justice and civil recourse do share, writ large, is their
view of tort law "as about deontological concepts such as right and wrong, in
contrast to efficiency accounts that focus on maximizing social welfare."34
27. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 8, at 403, 404.
28. JULEs L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 11-12 (1992).
29. Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 7 7 IOWA L. REV. 449, 451 (1992).
30. Goldberg, supra note 25, at 564.
31. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REv. 917, 945-47
(2010).
32. See, e.g., Stephen Darwall & Julian Darwall, Civil Recourse as Mutual Accountability, 39 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 17, 29-31 (2011) (discussing the work of Goldberg and Zipursky); see also John
C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of View:
Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1563 (2006) (arguing for a duty-based
conception of tort law centered on redressing private wrongs).
33. See Darwall & Darwall, supra note 32, at 35-36.
34. Jason M. Solomon, Civil Recourse as Social Equality, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 243, 243 (2011).
Note, however, that Goldberg and Zipursky have been said to align corrective justice with
other loss-allocating theories. See, e.g., Darwall & Darwall, supra note 32, at 29.
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B. The Externality of Existing Tort Theories
Notably, both efficiency theorists and fairness theorists are inescapably ar-
ticulating visions of tort steeped in values that arise outside of the law itself.
Some are more explicit about this normative externality than others. Corrective
justice, for its part, freely acknowledges that its aims are political and philo-
sophical. These goals are external to the law, strictly speaking, though tradi-
tionally recognized as important to it. Coleman has explained that his work is
designed to "present philosophical arguments" and to pique an interest in
"other areas of the law and political theory,"" while Weinrib has described the
Aristotelian account of corrective justice as "the beginning of legal philosophy
properly speaking."" Others have said that Fletcher is espousing a tort theory
derived from John Rawls's philosophy and Weinrib is advancing a point of
view reflective of Immanuel Kant." Some economists are equally forthright
about their commitment to external goals as the rationale for tort. Calabresi's
scholarship advocating a strict liability regime for accidents frankly proceeds
from the axiom that "the principal function of accident law is to reduce the sum
of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents."38 He analyzes ex-
isting tort doctrine by asking whether it effectively serves that goal. For exam-
ple, he concluded in 1961 that strict liability for ultrahazardous activities "has
not been brought to its logical conclusion in terms of risk-distribution theo-
ries:"" He observed that tort doctrine fell short by failing to hold actors strictly
liable for activities in "common usage" that involved infrequent but neverthe-
less substantial harms, suggesting that doctrine should be recalibrated to do a
better instrumental job.40
Other tort theorists eschew the "external" label. Their rejection of externali-
ty is certainly plausible, insofar as they each take as their starting point the doc-
35. COLEMAN, supra note 28, at xi.
36. Weinrib, supra note 8, at 410.
37. See, e.g., Patrick J. Kelley, Who Decides? Community Safety Conventions at the Heart of Tort Lia-
bility, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 315, 319 (1990). Goldberg has also described corrective justice as
the domain of analytic philosophers. See Goldberg, supra note 25, at 564.
38. CALABRESI, supra note 21, at 26. To be sure, Calabresi also mentions the need for such a sys-
tem to be "just," but explains that justice is not the primary goal of accident law so much as a
constraint that comes into play if any particular device within such a system is deemed "un-
fair." Id.
39. Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499,
543 (1961); see also id. (noting that consideration of the "grounds for risk distribution"
would dictate an "enormous broadening of the extra-hazardous activities doctrine").
40. Id. at 542-43.
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trinal architecture of the law. But even efficiency theorists and fairness theorists
who claim fidelity to doctrine inevitably import external values to fill out tort
elements that are open textured or, in the jargon of linguists, "hedges.""1 So, for
example, Landes and Posner begin with a nod to the internal by stating that
they "accept[] the existence, validity and importance of legal doctrine."4 2 They
describe their methodology in internal terms, as a canvass of tort rules.43 And
they zoom in specifically on a number of doctrinal matters, including reasona-
bleness," contributory negligence,4 5 assumption of risk,46 strict liability for ul-
trahazardous activities,4 7 defamation and fraud,4 punitive damages,4 and cau-
sation.50 But after claiming that their theory is merely a positive description of
how tort doctrine operates, they suggest that when inevitable ambiguities arise
in the application of doctrine, play in the doctrinal joints invites the efficiency
calculus. Thus, for example, although Landes and Posner argue that the posi-
tive economic theory of tort law is meant to explain doctrine,5 Posner's seminal
article A Theory of Negligence states that the purpose of tort "is to generate rules
of liability that if followed will bring about, at least approximately, the effi-
cient- the cost-justified -level of accidents and safety."52 It is a small but subtle
move from an explanatory theory that is agnostic as to the benefits of efficiency
to a prescriptive theory that celebrates efficiency and encourages the use of ju-
41. See, e.g., Michel Paradis, just Reasonable: Can Linguistic Analysis Help Us Know What It Is To
Be Reasonable?, 47 JURIM.ETRICS 169, 170 (2007). Paradis explains that broad modifiers that
are "referentially vacuous" are known by linguists as "hedges,' requiring the reader or listen-
er to engage in the process of interpreting the word. Id. at 170 & n.2. Studies show that peo-
ple reading two identical texts, one with hedge words and one without, retain the material
better when their faculties are activated by having to fill in hedge words. Id. at 171-72. This
has interesting implications for the community-constructing theory of tort. See infra notes
345-347 and accompanying text (discussing juries' work to fill out open-textured elements
by consulting community norms, an exercise that may deepen their understanding of those
norms).
42. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23, at 8.
43. Id. at 20. They find these rules in "casebooks, treatises, and the Restatement of Torts." Id.
44. See id. at 123-31.
45. See id. at 88-96.
46. See id. at 139-42.
47. See id. at 111-20.
48. See id. at 163-66.
49. See id. at 184-85.
so. See id. at 228-55.
51. Id. at 8.
52. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, i J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972) (emphasis added).
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dicial discretion to mold doctrinal rules to achieve that goal.s" And this move
begets a purely external brand of efficiency theory, the leaders of which claim
that "the welfare-based normative approach should be exclusively employed in
evaluating legal rules. That is, legal rules should be selected entirely with re-
spect to their effects on the well-being of individuals in society."5
Similarly, Goldberg and Zipursky distance themselves from externalists be-
cause they derive their civil recourse account primarily from the specifics of tort
doctrine itself.5 They have stated that "analysis of the myriad doctrines that
make up tort law" is essential to capturing the "essence of tortiousness."5 6 In-
deed, they have written specifically about doctrinal issues, including the ele-
ment of reliance in fraud, 7 assumption of risk as a principled means of reliev-
ing actors from duty, 8 and outrageousness in the intentional infliction of
emotional distress tort. 9 But their primary project has been to discern the
"general features that are constant across tort law" to understand the engine
53. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Too Good To Be True: The Positive Economic Theory ofLaw, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 1447, 1450 (1987) (reviewing LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23) ("Landes' and Posner's
positive theory of tort law looks at first as if it were merely a scientific explanation of the
forces that decide tort cases; tort doctrines are crafted so as to increase wealth. However, the
book also presents wealth maximization as a unifying normative principle of tort law that
could be used by judges to decide future cases, as Landes and Posner clearly think it
should.").
54. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARv. L. REV. 961, 967 (2001).
Kaplow and Shavell have been described as "distinguished legal academics [responsible for]
a massive project" promoting welfare, rather than fairness, as the appropriate criterion for
designing legal policy. See Jules L. Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare, 112 YALE L.J. 1511, 1511
(2003).
55. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Reasonableness in and out of Negligence Law, 163 U. PA. L.
REv. 2131, 2163 (2015) (explaining that Goldberg and Zipursky's theoretical emphasis on the
relational nature of tort law arises naturally from "the breach-duty nexus in the analytical
structure of negligence law"); see also John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages:
Fair v. Full Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 462 (2006) (analyzing tort damages using
a self-described "internal" approach "operating entirely at the level of lawyerly usage and
doctrine").
56. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse Defended: A Reply to Posner, Cala-
bresi, Rustad, Chamallas, and Robinette, 88 IND. L.J. 569, 570, 578 (2013).
57. See John C.P. Goldberg, Anthony J. Sebok & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Place of Reliance in
Fraud, 48 ARIz. L. REv. 1001 (20o6).
58. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Shielding Duty: How Attending to Assump-
tion of Risk, Attractive Nuisance, and Other "Quaint" Doctrines Can Improve Decisionmaking in
Negligence Cases, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 329, 342-51 (20o6).
s. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Snyder v. Phelps, Outrageousness, and the Open Texture of Tort
Law, 60 DEPAUL L. REv. 473 (2011).
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that drives particular outcomes.6 0 Thus, like the self-described internal theo-
rists of efficiency, they understand "doctrine" at a high level of generality that
leans on external disciplines for nuance. For instance, Zipursky's overarching
insight is that tort doctrine is "unified" in its requirement across multiple di-
verse causes of action that the plaintiff and defendant be relationally situated so
that a duty is owed from the latter to the former.61 Further, to come within the
tort domain, the failure to observe that duty must culminate in an injury to the
plaintiff.62 These abstract features are found throughout doctrine covering eve-
rything from defamation to nuisance to loss of consortium.63 But like the effi-
ciency theorists who derive their view from doctrinal architecture, the re-
coursians eventually shift away from doctrine to justify particular instances of
tort liability. For example, in explaining why some intentional behavior is con-
sidered tortious, Zipursky states that it is "obviously . .. wrong" without ex-
plaining why the wrongfulness is obvious or acknowledging the possibility that
it might be obvious to some people or groups and unproblematic to others.64
This move seems to either permit or require reference to some external body of
information about wrongfulness. Further, the "relational equity" referred to as
the cornerstone of tort liability is understood as a political entitlement, 6 there-
by placing tort at the service of an external, political goal.
6o. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 56, at 570.
61. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1,
15-17 (1998).
62. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 56, at 571; Zipursky, supra note 61, at 16.
63. See Zipursky, supra note 61, passim.
64. Zipursky, supra note s9, at 499 ("Battery, conversion, and fraud are the most stark exam-
ples" of torts involving intentional wrongs and, "[m] ost obviously, everyone knows that hit-
ting, stealing, and lying are wrong."). To be fair, Zipursky suggests that "wrongs" are reflec-
tive of social understandings, but does not indicate how those understandings are arrived at
or by whom. Id. at 478, 499. And many sympathetic scholars have taken Goldberg and
Zipursky at face value in describing their work as representing an "internalist perspective"
on tort. See, e.g., Rustad, supra note 21, at 421-23.
65. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a
Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 531 (2005) (arguing that "legislatures operate
under certain affirmative duties, including a duty to provide bodies of law that are integral
to liberal-constitutional government," including a body of tort law).
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C. The Degenerative Results of Competing External Tort Theories
The divide between the justice theorists and the efficiency theorists has
grown more pronounced in recent years.6 6 The recourse theorists accuse their
instrumental adversaries of neglecting the bilateral, individualized nature of
tort causes of action in favor of abstract "macrolevel policy factors."" For their
part, the efficiency partisans complain that recourse theory focuses on relation-
al wrongs as a means for achieving interpersonal equity without specifying
"where . . .we go to find out what is a 'wrong." 68
Both camps agree that a sound theory of tort will explain all three types of
liability: intentional, negligence, and strict. But each camp faults their oppo-
nents for failing this test. Recoursians contend that efficiency theories are
flawed because they assume that tort law's purpose is exclusively the assign-
ment of liability for accidents, and consequently are capable of explaining only
negligence or strict liability but not the intentional torts.69 Instead, efficiency
theorists are said to treat intentional wrongs as virtually irrelevant to a body of
law they consider "accident-law-plus."" For their part, the efficiency theorists
charge that even if recourse theory is a plausible explanation for intentional tort
liability and negligence, it does not justify strict liability, which involves rou-
tinized production of goods distributed to classes of consumers rather than
one-on-one interpersonal wrongdoing."
The increasing polarization of torts scholars, and the accelerating myopia of
their scholarship," is emblematic of a growing chorus of dissatisfaction with
Legal Realism more generally. While realism was originally lauded for its po-
tential to produce creative new ideas about improving the law, some have
66. See id.; see also Zipursky, supra note 22, at 2 (discussing the "disdain" that law and economics
scholars have expressed for philosophers espousing corrective-justice theories of tort).
67. Rustad, supra note 21, at 435.
68. Posner, supra note 21, at 473.
69. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31, at 953-56, 966-71.
70. Id. at 917.
71. Rustad, supra note 21, at 439; see also Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L.
REV. 433, 533-34 (2011) (observing that civil recourse treats collective injury problems as in-
dividual disputes, thereby forfeiting the "larger societal function of general deterrence" that
may be served by strict liability).
72. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1523 (1984) (describing
economists and jurisprudes as "blind" to the merits of the others' arguments); Rustad, supra
note 21, at 422 (referring to the academic "war" between efficiency theorists and morality
theorists).
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charged that the original promise of the "'law and' movement"" has grown
"stale."74 They contend that social scientists have subsumed the law into their
disciplines and used the law to drive their own scholarship, but they have failed
to translate these insights back into a vernacular that can be understood or ap-
plied by legal institutions. "Law cannot be fully explained by any other aca-
demic discipline, whether economics, political science, sociology, or anthropol-
ogy," they observe." The limitations of the instrumental study of law are typi-
typified by the current state of tort theory, as economists and philosophers
grow increasingly self-referential and less concerned with each other or with
personal injury law as it is practiced in the courts.
D. Using Doctrine To Devise an Internal Account of Tort
Granular doctrinal analysis may provide the theoretical clarity that instru-
mental analysis has failed to produce. In recent years, there has been a renewed
interest in the meaning and role of legal doctrine in the work of courts -a
scholarly trend dubbed by some "the New Doctrinalism."76 This movement re-
jects the realists' depiction of doctrine as a set of mechanistic, self-referential
rules that require specific outcomes," describing it instead as an analytical
flowchart whose decision boxes are designed to carry normative considera-
tions." The result is that "[d]octrine is . . . seen as important, not for its own
sake, but because of its connection to normative criteria."" Consequently, doc-
trinal "constraints" - far from limiting decision makers to a predetermined out-
come -actually liberate them to draw from external bodies of information as
73. Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Empiricism, Experimentalism, and Conditional Theory, 67
SMU L. REV. 141, 149 (2014).
74. Marie A. Failinger, Searching for the Crown of Feathers: An Essay on Psychology, Ethics, and
Truth in Constitutional Law, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 381, 395 (2000).
75. Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 73, at 149.
76. Balganesh, supra note 17, at 1857.
77. Id. at 1847-48.
78. Id. at 1848-49.
79. Id. at 1857; see also Leiter, supra note 16, at 1983-84 (explaining that the Legal Realists likely
thought that once they succeeded in exposing the extra-doctrinal factors on which judges re-
ly, doctrine would come to "track[] judicial intuitions about what is normatively important
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they analyze particular elements of a cause of action.o So instead of foreclosing
external considerations, a New Doctrinal account of tort law may actually open
windows through which instrumental concerns enter as analytical aids. In oth-
er words, the New Doctrinalism is not the antithesis of Legal Realism so much
as it is the tool for "translation between social science and law" necessary to
fulfill Legal Realism's early progressive promise." This Article takes its cue
from the New Doctrinalism, scrutinizing tort doctrine to see what decision
boxes actually have to say about normative criteria."
i. Approach
Legal doctrine is traditionally thought to be found in "the language of judi-
cial opinions."" In order to produce a comprehensive internal account of tort
without reviewing the entire body of reported American tort decisions, this Ar-
ticle scrutinizes select American torts cases representing all three headings of
liability from the antebellum to the modern period. Furthermore, to investigate
whether those results are consistent with tort doctrine as represented by the
entirety of American case law, it also refers to the American Law Institute
(ALI)'s Restatement of Torts. To restate particular bodies of law, the ALI calls on
a "collective of judges, scholars, and practitioners" to advise a selected reporter
as he or she translates case law into a compressed summary of prevailing Amer-
ican doctrine.84
so. See Balganesh, supra note 17, at 1848-49 (explaining that doctrine can be understood as a
structure that reflects normative considerations and assigns corresponding weights to facts
in the record).
Si. Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 73, at 149 (identifying this failure to translate as one reason to
move away from traditional Legal Realism); see also Leiter, supra note 16, at 1983 (noting
that Legal Realism was originally designed to bring existing doctrine "down to earth").
82. Like the works of corrective-justice and efficiency theorists, this Article ultimately shifts
,from an internal to an external point of view. However, it does so consciously, only after ask-
ing whether doctrine itself plainly points to an external value that makes duties "genuine."
As discussed in Part I and Sections II.A through II.C, this Article finds that doctrine express-
es a primary interest in the construction of sociological community. The Article thus moves
from an internal understanding of tort to external considerations, but only because doctrine
privileges them. This is a subtle but important difference from beginning with an external
commitment and working backwards to ask whether tort law can serve it, or beginning with
an internal inquiry and lapsing into external considerations when doctrine loses traction.
83. Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What Is Legal Doctrine?, 1oo Nw. U. L. REV. 517, 518
(2006).
84. Ellen M. Bublick, A Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Intentional Harm to Persons-
Thoughts, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1335, 1336 (2009) (praising the ALI restatement process
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Restatements are not law. They are, however, "supposed to represent the
general law on the subject in the United States."" Specifically, the ALI director
himself described the purpose and value of Restatements as making "clear
statements of the rules of the common law today operative in the great majority
of [the] States," based on "the mass of case authority and legal literature."86 To
the extent that Restatements achieve this goal, they are obvious (though ad-
mittedly imperfect) candidates to serve as compressed textual summaries of ac-
tual court opinions.
Specifically, this Article relies primarily on linguistic analysis of tort doc-
trine as found in the Restatement (Second). Although this document has been
partially superseded by the rollout of several Restatement (Third) sections, it
serves as the best text for a variety of reasons. Most importantly, the Restate-
ment (Second) was conceived as a single project and, when it was completed in
1974, it covered the entirety of American tort doctrine. In contrast, the ALI has
undertaken the Restatement (Third) as a series of discrete projects, each devoted
exclusively to a single segment of tort doctrine. 7 The ALI has published the
Restatement (Third) of Products Liability, the Restatement (Third) of Liability for
Physical and Emotional Harm, and the Restatement (Third) of Apportionment of
Liability, with Restatements yet to come for Intentional Torts to Persons and Lia-
bility for Economic Harm. Therefore, for purposes of comparing the relative em-
phasis on different theories across multiple unrelated tort-based causes of ac-
tion, the Restatement (Second) was a more reliable document than the still-
incomplete Restatement (Third). Given that one hallmark of a persuasive torts
theory is its relevance across multiple types of liability" and causes of action, it
is difficult to conduct a comparative linguistic analysis of a document that
treats only some causes of action.
In addition, the Restatement (Third) was promulgated during a period of
increasing politicization of torts generally and the ALI process tangentially. For
for forcing those involved to "wrestle with problems [i.e., inconsistencies in the law] that
might otherwise be finessed").
85. Kristen David Adams, The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons from the Restatement Movement, 33
HOFSTRA L. REV. 423, 443 (2004) (quoting DeLoach v. Alfred, 952 P.2d 320, 322 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1997), vacated on other grounds, 960 P.2d 628 (Ariz. 1998)). Some critics question how
neutral a summary of tort law is given by the Restatement in general and the Restatement
(Second) in particular. Those criticisms will be addressed in more depth below.
86. William Draper Lewis, History of the American Law Institute and the First Restatement of the
Law, in RESTATEMENT IN THE COURTS 19 (Am. Law Inst., 1945).
87. See, e.g., Michael D. Green, Flying Trampolines and Falling Bookcases: Understanding the Third
Restatement of Torts, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1011, 1012 (2011).
88. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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example, one of the advisers to the Restatement (Third) of Products Liability has
written that when the project got underway "the processes of the ALI . .. found
themselves enmeshed in interest group appeals" and the group's reporters, de-
spite "doing substantial amounts of case research and analysis on their
own ... had become, perforce, brokers of ideas advanced by contending politi-
cal forces."" Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm has "endorsed the economic definition of reasonableness."90
In contrast, the Restatement (Second) was devised over a period of years
from 1954 to 1979. As a result, it represents a moment in time when the Legal
Realist search for external justifications was fully underway but before the effi-
ciency theorists had occupied the field." Admittedly, some have accused Re-
statement (Second) reporter Prosser of "bootstrapping"-namely, of citing stray
cases, typically those that cited his own work, in order to give an impression of
settled doctrine.92 Critics lodged these accusations particularly in the areas of
invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and product li-
ability where Prosser essentially advocated for new headings of tort liability."
The Restatement (Second), however, was not obviously driven by any single in-
strumental theory, as might be said of the Restatement (Third). Consequently, it
is a plausible dataset for reaching a descriptive conclusion about the relative
89. Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI Restatement Project, 48
VAND. L. REv. 631, 645-46 (1995). Shapo's criticisms of the process were accompanied by a
frank admission that the ALI's substantive changes to the products-liability Restatement
overemphasized the requirement that plaintiffs show that a "defective" design could have
been replaced with a reasonable alternative design, to the exclusion of a negligence-based
approach using the Learned Hand risk-utility test. Id. at 662-64.
go. Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 329 (2012) (cit-
ing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM (AM.
LAw INST. 2010)). Notably, some torts scholars had explicitly urged the reporters on the var-
ious Restatement (Third) projects to transparently adopt such a theoretical anchor. See, e.g.,
Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Tort Doctrine and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 54 VAND.
L. REv. 1413, 1414 (2001).
91. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, Legal Phenomena, Knowledge, and Theory: A
Cautionary Tale of Hedgehogs and Foxes, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 683, 696-97 (2002) (explain-
ing that both the Restatement (First) and Restatement (Second) suggested to courts that eco-
nomic efficiency and corrective justice were both possible dimensions of reasonableness ra-
ther than exclusive determinants of it, and suggesting that "the success of the Restatements
has resided, in large measure, in their capacity to encompass this variety of common sense
values").
92. See Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, Prosser and His Influence, 6 J. TORT L. 27, 29
(2013).
93. See Anita Bernstein, How To Make a New Tort, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1539, 1552-54 (1997) (discuss-
ing how Prosser influenced the recognition of new causes of action).
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emphasis that tort doctrine itself places on various instrumental theories that
justify the assignment of interpersonal liability.
Using the Restatement (Second) as its primary dataset, the Article under-
takes a rudimentary linguistic analysis, determining the comparative number of
times that references to efficiency theory, justice theory, and community appear
within the document. Social scientists have recognized that texts can be treated
in one of two ways: as "discourses to be .. . understood" or as "collections of
word data containing information about the position of the texts' authors on
predefined policy dimensions."" Understanding the discourse represented by
the Restatement is a difficult task because of its length and because of the sub-
jective commitments that any reader brings to its meaning. (For example, alt-
hough Landes and Posner in The Economic Structure of Tort Law claim to rely on
the Restatement as a source of doctrine, the book cites it just eight times for a
handful of doctrinal rules.") Treating a text as a dataset overcomes both prob-
lems. Among other methods for analyzing lengthy texts is to define policy posi-
tions a priori and then search for expressions of those positions within a "virgin
text" using predetermined words or phrases derived from "reference texts" and
understood to capture the selected positions.96
Thus, using the rudimentary technique of "locating" within the Restatement
words identified with various tort theories, one can expect to learn a great deal
about the conscious and unconscious attitudes of the ALI drafters and the
judges whose opinions they are referencing regarding the relevance of those
theories within tort doctrine. This type of analysis is, of course, limited. Any
analysis that relies on preselected values and associated words is, by definition,
screening out other values and words." And it is possible that searched words
94. Michael Laver, Kenneth Benoit & John Garry, Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts
Using Words as Data, 97 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 311, 312 (2003).
g. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23, at 42 & n.13, 49 & n.29, 70, 88 & n.4, 111-12 & n-73, 119
& n.91, 126 & n.9, 298 & n.29 (citing Restatement provisions on ultrahazardous activities,
contributory negligence, standards of care, products liability, nuisance, and defenses to the
use of force).
96. Laver et al., supra note 94, at 312-13. In order to conduct an a priori content categorization,
one generally begins with "theoretical expectations originating outside of the text in ques-
tion." Adam F. Simon & Michael Xenos, Dimensional Reduction of Word-Frequency Data as a
Substitutefor Intersubjective Content Analysis, 12 POL. ANALYSIs 63, 64 (2004). Admittedly, fail-
ing to count words associated with other tort theories (social insurance or consumer protec-
tion come to mind) means the analysis will not produce an account that bears on the im-
portance of those theories.
97. An alternate textual analysis method employed by social scientists is to use specialized soft-
ware that permits the adoption of categories as they emerge from the text itself rather than
beginning with predetermined categories. See Simon & Xenos, supra note 96, at 64. A full-
1340
126:1320 2017
TORT LAW INSIDE OUT
may not correlate directly with the theoretical candidates being compared;
"community" is used more often as a lay concept than is "efficiency," so it is
possible that the word count may not be a perfectly robust representation of
the policy weight accorded the theory represented by that word. However, the
word count is instructive as a rough tool to compare the relative weights as-
signed various tort theories, and to confirm an understanding of the doctrinal
"discourse" represented by the cases themselves.
2. Results
The digital version of the Restatement (Second) was searched for references
to various tort theories in its text, comments, and illustrations." The results
are instructive. They reveal that tort doctrine is not fully or exclusively commit-
ted to any of the broad instrumental schools of thought identified by current
scholars. "Utility" and "efficiency" are referenced thirty-seven times altogether
(thirty-four references to "utility" and three to "efficiency"). Further, "utility"
and "efficiency" are referenced in connection with strict liability and negli-
gence, but not in connection with any of the intentional invasions of interests
represented by the nominate torts, except for nuisance. For their part, "morali-
ty" and "justice" are referenced twenty-seven times altogether (twenty-four
references to "morality" and three to "justice")." "Morality" and "justice" are
referenced in connection with nominate torts such as intentional harms to per-
sonality, misrepresentation, defamation, interference with the marriage rela-
tion, interference with contract, nuisance, and interference with interests in the
support of land, as well as in connection with negligence, but not in connection
with strict liability. In other words, neither the efficiency theory of tort law nor
the morality theory of tort law is considered doctrinally relevant to all three cat-
egories of tort.
This thumbnail analysis of text describing doctrine simply confirms the in-
tractable split between morality and efficiency. But taking the analysis a step
further reveals that an underexamined concept - community - is actually better
scale analysis of the Restatement using this method would yield enormous information, but it
is outside the scope of this Article.
gs. For a discussion of the Restatement (Second) as a representation of tort doctrine, see supra
text accompanying notes 84-87, 91-93. Each concept-specific search was structured to return
multiple variations of relevant words; for example, "moral," "morals," and "morality."
99. The Restatement references "justice" seven additional times, but all of those references arise
in the determinations of liability for the use of force in "bringing to justice" persons sought
by the political community. Thus, the "justice" referred to is not the private, interpersonal
justice of tort but the public justice of criminal law.
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represented in the Restatement's compressed textual summary of doctrine than
either of the established theoretical concepts. "Community" is alluded to forty-
seven times.oo Notably, references to community appear in virtually every divi-
sion of the Restatement."o' "Community" is considered legally relevant to negli-
gence; strict liability; intentional torts including harm to persons, reputation,
and privacy; misrepresentation; unjustifiable litigation; interference in domes-
tic relations; interference with advantageous economic relations; invasions of
interests in land other than by trespass; and prima facie tort. In this respect, it
bests both efficiency and morality, neither of which is considered relevant to
more than two categories of tort liability. Thus, textual analysis suggests that
whether by intuition or by design, the drafters of the Restatement have identi-
fied community as a conceptual cornerstone of tort.102
The significance of this result is underlined by comparing the appearances
of "community" in contract and property doctrine as given in their respective
Restatements. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts mentions "community"
just three times, while the Restatements (Second) and (Third) of Property, which
together comprehensively cover property law, mention "community" sixteen
times. This makes broad conceptual sense. Contract governs voluntary duties
that individual members of the community elect to adopt toward each other, or
the carving out of a bilateral relationship separate and apart from general
community expectations, explaining why the Restatement of Contracts features
the fewest references to "community." Property governs the duties of all com-
100. For a list of Restatement (Second) of Torts sections that allude to "community," see infra Ap-
pendix.
101. The only division that includes no reference to "community" is Division 6, "Injurious False-
hood (Including Slander of Title and Trade Libel)."
102. A study of select Restatement (Third) projects confirms that community is a major referent.
For example, the black letter, comments, and Reporters' Comments of the Restatement
(Third) of Products Liability refer to "efficiency" and "utility" four times (Introduction and
sections 4, 20, and 16); to "morality" and "justice" three times (sections 1, 2, and 19); and to
"community" four times (sections 1, 2, 4, and 6). All references to "distributive justice" were
stripped from word counts as the phrase represents a concept distinct from the "corrective
justice" theory of torts. A similar count is found in the Restatement (Third) of Liability for
Physical and Emotional Harm, with twenty references to "efficiency" and "utility"; twenty-
three references to "morality" and "justice"; and twenty to "community." While these counts
do not reflect a role for community as primary as found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
they confirm that it stands on equal footing with other concepts contending for theoretical
dominance. Further, as the ALI has yet to produce volumes on other segments of tort law,
particularly liability for intentional harms, the dataset from which the count is drawn is in-
complete in some significant ways. In addition, the Restatement (Third) project has more ex-
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munity members to a particular property holder and the reciprocal duties of
that property holder to various members of the community, explaining why the
Restatement of Property finds an intermediate number of references to "commu-
nity." In sum, within private law, the duty "of all to all," or the duty of every
member of a relevant community to every other member of that community, is
the unique province of tort law.' 03 Therefore, references to "community" with-
in tort doctrine not just are frequent and present within each heading of liabil-
ity, but also serve a systematic purpose.
E. "Community" as the Doctrinal Source of Liability Norms
Tort doctrine as summarized by the Restatement uses "community" as a
transom through which decision makers can import extralegal norms to deter-
mine liability for injuries. Specifically, at least one doctrinal element within all
three kinds of tort liability incorporates a degree of indeterminacy.' These in-
determinate or "open-textured""' elements function as "placeholders" into
which normative preferences can be inserted.' 0 6 As summarized below, tort
doctrine instructs that the normative preferences to be imported into all three
classes of liability are those of "the community."
Intentional / Nominate Tort Liability. The intentional torts involve behavior
that some would describe as self-evidently wrong, which suggest that they are
the least subjective or open textured."o' But even these torts cantot be reduced
to purely positive requirements; rather, most of them have at least one "place-
holder" element that is left to be filled in with information about community
norms. So even for such "objective" torts as trespass and interference with con-
tract, doctrine directs the decision maker to consult the community for infor-
103. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REv. 652, 660 (1873) (en-
dorsing the idea that tort law contains "duties of all the world to all the world").
104. According to some New Doctrinalists, all common law concepts operate in a similar fashion,
having both a structural analytical meaning which remains consistent over time and an
open-textured, normative meaning that can "accommodate changes in ... values and goals"
over time. Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Structure and Value in the
Common Law, 163 U. PA. L. REv. 1241, 1244 (2015).
1os. Zipursky, supra note 59, at 475.
106. E.g., Goldberg, supra note 25, at 576 (describing the concept of a wrong as a placeholder in
corrective-justice theory).
107. See, e.g., Zipursky, supra note 59, at 499 (describing various intentional torts as "plainly con-
ceived of as wrongs in a more full-blooded sense"). But see Posner, supra note 21, at 473
(questioning whether "everyone" can agree that anything is wrong).
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mation about interpersonal behavioral expectations."os For example, liability
for nondisclosure causing pecuniary loss turns in part on "the ethical sense of
the community" as to the legitimate advantage one can gain from superior
skills or knowledge.109 Liability for interference with contractual relations de-
pends on "community custom," which, if not clear to the judge, will be allocat-
ed to the jury with its "common feel for the state of community mores."o
Community plays a similar role in intentional torts involving interference with
the ownership or use of land. For example, using a public highway that crosses
private land is not tortious if "reasonable," with "reasonable [ness]...
depend[ent] upon the usage of the community.""' Private nuisance liability is
a question of reasonable land uses, determined in accord with the "interests of
the community as a whole."" 2 Reasonable uses of water are a question of social
values determined with reference to community.'
Doctrine also points the decision maker to community norms in cases in-
volving intentional assaults on social institutions like marriage. Liability for in-
terference with the marriage relationship will not be assigned if the defendant
believed "in view of the social and moral standards generally accepted in the
community" that she was promoting the alienated spouse's "happiness."1' The
prima facie tort allows for liability outside of strict tort categories when "culpa-
ble," "[un]justifiable" conduct -defined as behavior out of step with the com-
munity sense of "right"-demands it.1 1 5 Moreover, the decision maker must
consult community norms to measure not just the plaintiff's case, but also the
defendant's position: when an intentional tort defendant claims that the plain-
tiff is not entitled to recovery because he consented to the contested behavior,
consent may be found based on community custom, even in the absence of
verbal agreement."'
Doctrine again leaves liability decisions to community norms in the most
"socially constructed" intentional torts -those involving injuries to reputation,
1o8. "Community" operates to reconcile the Zipursky view of "wrongfulness" and the Posner cri-
tique by simultaneously reducing the hyperbole of "everyone" to an identifiable group and
providing a basis for understanding what that group would agree is a "wrong."
log. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977).
no. Id. § 767 cmt. 1.
i. Id. § 192 cmt. e.
112. Id. 5 826 cmt. c.
113. Id. 5850A(d) cmt. f.
114. Id. § 686 cmt. f.
i1s. Id. § 870 cmt. e.
116. Id. § 892 cmt. d.
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privacy, and emotional well-being. For example, liability for the tort of outrage
turns on whether the actor behaved in a way "utterly intolerable in a civilized
community," so that "an average member of the community" would, upon
hearing of the behavior, exclaim "[o] utrageous! "' 'Whether profanity used by
a public utility to a customer, for example, can ever meet this test depends on
whether such speech is "customary in the particular community.""' Liability
for giving unwanted publicity to private life takes into account that the public
can have a "legitimate concern" with "news," based on "the mores of the com-
munity.""' So, too, with liability for placing a plaintiff in a false light- the de-
piction must be "highly offensive," which the Restatement notes "applies only
when the defendant knows that the plaintiff, as a reasonable man, would be
justified in the eyes of the community in feeling seriously offended and ag-
grieved by the publicity." 2 0
Negligence Liability. The Restatement's discussion of negligence refers to
"community" more than a dozen times, always as a source of liability stand-
ards. First, the Restatement squarely indicates that the duty a defendant owes a
plaintiff is contingent on the community in which the dispute takes place.' 2 '
Further, in its discussion of the standard of conduct for the "reasonable man,"
the Restatement explains that "negligence is a departure from a standard of con-
duct demanded by the community for the protection of others against unrea-
sonable risk."m It specifies that actors are negligent if they do not know the
qualities of humans, animals, things, and forces "in so far as they are matters of
common knowledge at the time and in the community."' The utility of the ac-
tor's conduct is determined with reference to the benefits it provides to the
community.' 2 4 A property owner may be deemed liable for injuries to one who
has entered onto his land if the entry accords with community custom.'2 5 The
reasonableness of the danger posed by a consumer product is determined based
on the "ordinary knowledge common to the community" as to the item's char-
acteristics. 6 The liability of an employer for the acts of his independent con-
117. Id. § 46 cmt. d.
118. Id. § 48 cmt. c.
iig. Id. § 652D cmt. g.
120. Id. § 652E cmt. c.
121. Id. 5 328A cmt. c.
122. Id. § 283 cmt. C.
123. Id. § 290(a).
124. Id. § 292 cmt. a.
125. Id. § 330 cmt. e.
126. Id. § 402A cmt. i.
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tractor is said to be contingent on whether the work subcontracted poses risk
beyond those "usual in the community."1 27
Strict Liability. In strict liability, where a defendant's activity is tortious if
"abnormally dangerous," the Restatement considers community norms crucial.
It balances the threats associated with the activity against "any usefulness it
may have for the community."1 28 It also considers whether the activity is one of
"common usage," defined to mean one carried on "by many people in the
community."129
In sum, tort doctrine describes interpersonal duties in open-textured terms
and then points to the concrete institution "community" whose norms are to
close those gaps in specific cases. To understand how tort law's doctrinal focus
on community allows the importation and reconciliation of various instrumen-
tal concerns, one must first unpack what the law means when it uses the word.
II. UNPACKING COMMUNITY
"Community" is referenced throughout the law.'`0 It is "one of those
words-like 'culture,' 'myth,' 'ritual,' 'symbol'--bandied around in ordinary,
everyday speech, apparently readily intelligible to speaker and listener," but
difficult to deploy with precision. 3 ' Perhaps for this reason, very little effort
has been made to define concretely what "community" means when used in le-
gal doctrine.132 As a result, the term can connote groups ranging from the or-
127. Id. § 416 cmt. d.
128. Id. § 520 cmt. f.
129. Id. cmt. i.
130. See, e.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky,. Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of Community, 71
WASH. L. REv. 1 (1996); Mark Rosen, The Radical Possibility of Limited Community-Based In-
terpretation of the Constitution, 43 WM. &MARYL. REV. 927 (2002).
131. ANTHONY P. COHEN, THE SYMBOLIC CONSTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY 11 (1985).
132. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, A Process Theory of Torts, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1313, 1320-21, 1345
(1994) (describing community as one of the contending "first principles" for developing tort
doctrine and suggesting that tort liability should be a function of two intersecting variables:
first, whether an actor can be said to have caused an injury; and second, whether "the com-
munity's norms," which he does not define concretely, approve of imposing liability on the
causing actor). Patrick J. Kelley has written extensively on the theoretical importance of
community in determining tort liability norms. See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 37. Kelley has
identified doctrinal concepts that are designed to import social policy. In determining this
policy, judges do not consult their own preferences, but rather "the customs and conven-
tions that people in the community follow in order to safely coordinate their conduct with
the conduct of others." Id. at 319. Robert Post has also written thoughtfully about the nature
and role of community in the liability determinations that most directly implicate communi-
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ganized state to ad hoc collectives of like-minded neighbors. Unsurprisingly, its
invocation in legal discourse is just as likely to obscure as it is to illuminate.
This Part attempts to sharpen the understanding of what tort doctrine means
when it refers to community. Legal scholars often use the term "community" to
refer to a Lockean polity, thus impliedly referring to a group that is political in
nature and design. However, in tort, "community" is better understood as a so-
ciological unit of organization separate and apart from the political unit of or-
ganization represented by the state.
Sociological communities are groups of people with shared interests or cir-
cumstances who coordinate their relationships and lifestyles privately outside
the political processes of the state. In doing so, they rely on the informal devel-
opment of social norms rather than the political promulgation of state positive
law. Furthermore, social scientists have long distinguished between different
tiers of sociological community. Community may be constituted in a traditional
fashion, among a group of geographically compact and culturally unified peo-
ple. In addition, community may also be constituted in a modern fashion,
among a group of geographically diffuse and culturally heterogeneous people.
Traditional communities tend to generate social norms that reflect shared val-
ues and morals and are closed to external normative influences. In contrast,
modern communities tend to generate social norms that are more efficient be-
ty norms: the dignitary torts of defamation and invasion of privacy that require a third-
party witness to complete the injury. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Def-
amation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691, 713 (1986) [hereinafter
Post, Defamation]; Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in
the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957 (1989) [hereinafter Post, Privacy].
However, despite their identification of "community" in the process of determining
liability norms, these scholars have tended to invoke "community" without seriously consid-
ering the composition or operation of the organization they are referring to, or what the pre-
cise nature of "community" might mean for their vision of tort. Kelley has noted in passing
that there may be a disconnect between the "composite" community standard and that of a
"subsegment of society," but has failed to expand on the dichotomy between these commu-
nity norms. See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 37, at 381-82. Post, too, has acknowledged the heter-
ogeneous nature of sociological community, but he has treated the reality as a problem ra-
ther than an opportunity. Specifically, he has raised the possibility-especially troubling in
speech torts -that where the norms of two communities are competing for superiority in a
given case, the more populous or culturally powerful community will "effac[e]" the other.
See Post, Privacy, supra, at 977 & n.104. In sum, even those who recognize that "community"
is relevant tend to treat it as yet another "hedge" within tort doctrine, missing an opportuni-
ty to consider its more generative possibilities. A more thorough understanding of the socio-
logical communities that are the site of norm development, as attempted in this Article,
would both provide a principled basis for selecting between "composite" and "subsegment"
norms and prevent the effacement of small group norms in some cases.
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cause their members lack shared morality and are therefore open to a plurality
of normative influences.13 3
Importantly, the two kinds of community can coexist within a polity. This
means that individuals who belong to more than one community activate mo-
rality norms when participating in closed community decision making and ac-
tivate efficiency norms when participating in open community decision mak-
ing. The United States originated as a collective of traditional communities,
eventually developed an overarching modern community, and currently nests
multiple traditional groups subsidiary to the single modern group. This devel-
opment demonstrates that private interactions may take place either within
closed or within open groups, and that expectations about relational duties in
those interactions can be expected to toggle between morality norms and utility
norms. This, of course, has implications for tort liability, as will be discussed in
Part III.
A. Political Community and Public Law
Legal scholars often understand "community" as a unit of political organi-
zation in a Lockean sense. Locke recognized that individuals who wished to
pursue individual economic ends while securing a civil society "willingly ac-
cept[ed] ... limitations on their liberty and property in return for the benefits
they receive[d] 'from the labour, assistance, and society of others in the same
Community." 134 These limits are imposed through positive regulations passed
by a government that represents the community.13 Further, individuals "in-
vest[] [government] with the outward force needed to compel compliance"
with these directives. 136 Lockean "community" is synonymous with a polity
that is represented by and has agreed to abide by the commands of some for-
mal government, be it federal, state, or local. In exchange for accepting these
limits, political communities expect the state to use its authority to maximize
their health, safety, and welfare. So, for example, criminal law promulgated by
political communities (which compel compliance to maximize safety) identifies
133. See infra notes 183-184 and accompanying text.
134. See Steven J. Heyman, The Conservative-Liberiarian Turn in First Amendment Jurisprudence,
117 W. VA. L. REV. 231, 305 (2014) (citing JOHN LocKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk.
II, § 130 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1698)).
135. See, e.g., id. at 304-05.
136. Id. at 306; see also JOHN LocKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 7, 12 (Mark Goldie ed., 2010).
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conduct as "impermissible""' or "forbidden."" And those who engage in be-
havior the political community has identified as threatening are generally inca-
pacitated in order to neutralize the perceived threat. The commands are derived
through a democratic process and can be adapted from time to time to reflect
changing public preferences as expressed through popular elections. So when
the political community is dissatisfied with the state's provision of these ser-
vices, it can alter the composition of state bodies in hopes of striking a better
exchange. It is the political community that is referred to in public law dis-
course because public law is, as a rule, adopted by a political process and ad-
ministered by the state."'
B. Sociological Community and Tort
"Community" may also be used to refer to a group of individuals who in-
teract for purposes unrelated to securing state-sponsored benefits. These socio-
logical communities coalesce because the state is incapable of "meet[ing] the
psychic demand of individuals because .. . it is too large, too complex, too bu-
reaucratized, and altogether too aloof . . .. The state can enlist popular enthusi-
asm, can conduct crusades, can mobilize on behalf of great "causes," . . . but as a
regular and normal means of meeting human needs . . . it is inadequate."" 0
Instead, sociological communities are the loci of the private, interpersonal
relationships of daily life. They encourage the desirable private behavior that
may simply be "too costly a project for the state to undertake relative to the
benefits," as Posner has observed.14 ' Further, they account for cultural varia-
tions within political boundaries that are beyond the reach of positive law (at
137. Kenneth W. Simons, The Crime/Tort Distinction: Legal Doctrine and Normative Perspectives,
17 WIDENER L.J. 719, 723 (20o8) (emphasis omitted).
138. Cooter, supra note 72, at 1525.
139. For example, the constitutional doctrine addressing the permissibility of government limits
on "obscene" speech defers to "contemporary community standards" regarding prurience
and indicates the national polity. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24, 32-34 (973). Stat-
utes like the federal Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act typically
equate "local communities" with political subdivisions of the state. See 42 U.S.C. § iool(b)
(2012).
140. DENNIS E. POPLIN, COMMUNITIES: A SURVEY OF THEORIES AND METHODS OF RESEARCH 7
(1979) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Robert A. Nisbet, Moral Values and Community, 5 INT'L
REv. COMMUNITY DEV. 77, 82 (1960)).
141. Richard A. Posner, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT'L
REv. L. &ECON. 369, 370 (1999).
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either the state or federal level).142 Finally, they have the capacity to channel in-
terpersonal tensions into resolutions that preempt the need for state peacekeep-
ing." Thus, in a number of ways, sociological communities relieve political
communities of law-promulgating and law-enforcing obligations and thereby
serve an indispensable and unique function. Communities do this important
work by identifying and signaling interpersonal expectations or social norms.
Unlike the positive laws of political communities, sociological norms are not
typically "promulgated" in a single transparent vote sponsored by the state ap-
paratus.144 instead, they tend to "result from (and crystallize) the gradual
emergence of a consensus" among group members over time."s Adjudication
of private disputes through common-law courts is one way that communities
develop these critical "social rules."14 6
Sociological community may be defined as "an aggregate of people who
share a common interest"'4 7 taking part in a "network of social relations
142. See, e.g., MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws 9 (Ane M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748) (explaining that the best laws are tailored to the cir-
cumstances of those who are expected to be guided by them: "They should be related to the
physical aspect of the country; to the climate, be it freezing, torrid, or temperate; to the prop-
erties of the terrain, its location and extent; to the way of life of the peoples, be they plow-
men, hunters, or herdsmen; they should relate to the degree of liberty that the constitution
can sustain, to the religion of the inhabitants, their inclinations, their wealth, their number,
their commerce, their mores and their manners. . . .").
143. See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc. 347 F.3 d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[A]n age-
old purpose of the law of torts is to provide a substitute for violent retaliation against
wrongful injury. . . .").
144. See Posner, supra note 141, at 370.
145. Id.
146. Adams, supra note 85, at 446-47 (quoting ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON
LAw 3 (1966)). One might argue that allowing for more heterogeneity in the development
of common law-liability expectations within a unitary political entity is actually consistent
with a liberal democratic theory seeking maximum autonomy of individuals within the
structure of the state. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court 2oo9 Term -Foreword:
Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARY. L. REv. 4, 44 (2010).
147. THOMAS BENDER, COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 5 (1978). Typically, commu-
nity is thought to arise "in a particular locality," id., but of course the common interest that
serves as the organizing catalyst need not be geographic. It may be professional or, in the age
of electronic activity, virtual. For example, tort doctrine has been made available to instanti-
ate the values of professional communities (for example, in linking medical malpractice lia-
bility to the standard of care of similarly situated physicians) and could readily be used to
instantiate the values of online communities (for example, to determine whether members
of a social media platform would consider particular language to have defamatory implica-
tions). Although this Article's discussion is limited to sociological communities that arise
geographically, its attempt to address the difficulties that arise when members of insular
communities are forced into an interpersonal relationship with nonmembers is an unavoid-
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marked by mutuality." 4 Within community, as sociologists describe it, group
members "participate together in discussion and decisionmaking."1 4 9 Two
characteristics essential to any group that is to be deemed a sociological com-
munity are a sense of "solidarity" and a sense of "significance" among mem-
bers.s0 "Solidarity" can be described as "social unity, togetherness, social cohe-
sion or a sense of belonging. It encompasses all those sentiments which draw
people together (sympathy, courtesy, gratitude, trust and so on) . . . ."is' in
short, "solidarity" is achieved by the observance of whatever norms are estab-
lished to govern relationships among members. "Significance" can be described
as the sensation that "each person feels he has a role to play, his own function
to fulfill in the reciprocal exchanges of the social scene."' 52 Notably, sociological
studies have observed that in order to identify with a community, members
must perceive that they have influence over community norms; at the same
time, the solidarity that marks communities depends on the ability of the
group to influence its members." The cohesion evident in communities is not
able issue in the non-geographic community context as well. The most pointed and current
example of this configuration arises in the online speech context, where a particular
virtual community may generate speech based on a common norm that targets a
nonmember whose different norms render the speech injurious. See, e.g., Chris Suellentrop,
Can Video Games Survive?: The Disheartening GamerGate Campaign, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct.
25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/201 4/10/26/opinion/sunday/the-disheartening-gamer
gate-campaign.html [http://perma.cc/3HYH-C5R4] (describing the threatening remarks
that members of online gaming communities have made about female game developers who
work outside of those communities). The same dynamic is on display when the medical
community coalesces around a professional standard of care. Although addressing the dis-
sonance of non-geographic communities within tort law is not the focus of this Article, some
of the proposals herein might effectively map onto disputes that arise within and among
those communities.
148. BENDER, supra note 147, at 7. As will be discussed in detail below, see infra Section II.D.3, a
single individual can belong to more than one community depending on the capacity in
which she is acting.
149. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN
AMERICAN LIFE 333 (1985). However, sociologists who have studied "community" agree that
it defies easy definition. See, e.g., David W. McMillan & David M. Chavis, Sense of Communi-
ty: A Definition and Theory, 14 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 6, 6-9 (1986). In fact, one 1955 study
identified ninety-four different definitions of the word "community" used in various con-
texts. George A. Hillery, Jr., Definitions of Community: Areas of Agreement, 20 RURAL Soc. 111
(1955).
150. See David B. Clark, The Concept of Community: A Re-examination, 21 Soc. REV. 397, 404
(1973).
151. Id.
152. Id. (quoting R.M. MAcIvER & C.H. PAGE, SOCIETY 293 (1961)).
153. McMillan & Chavis, supra note 149, at ii.
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solely a product of group pressure on individuals, but also of opportunities for
individuals to exert pressure on the group. 154
Communities construct themselves by "mak[ing] members.. . . [They]
create a sense of belonging among their inhabitants that draws people in, binds
them together, and fosters a collective identity."' This "solidarity" is cultivated
in large part by maintaining boundaries that distinguish between belonging
and isolation, thereby reinforcing the cohesion of those within the boundary."'
Group members generate "shared expectations or rules, some tacit, some ex-
plicit, about how one ought to act in particular contexts," otherwise known as
social norms.15 7 Social norms serve multiple purposes: for example, they con-
trol interpersonal behavior without extracting the costs associated with private
violence or the invocation of state power.5 8 Furthermore, they reinforce the
"sense of mutuality" among community members."' Social norms are shared
by a plurality of community members and are "sustained by [their] approval
and disapproval."' 60
One leading mechanism for creating community boundaries and cultivat-
ing social norms is to identify certain acts as "deviant."'61 When deviants "ven-
ture out to the edges of the group" they are confronted by community mem-
bers concerned with "the cultural integrity" of the group, and the group at
large participates in that confrontation to inform one another about where they
wish the group's boundaries to be placed.162 Confrontations over boundary
placement are essential and welcomed because "[e]ach time the community
moves to censure some act of deviation .. . and convenes a formal ceremony to
deal with the responsible offender, it sharpens the authority of the violated
norm and restates where the boundaries of the group are located."' 6' Notably,
154. See id.
1ss. NAN GOODMAN, BANISHED: COMMON LAW AND THE RHETORIC OF SOCIAL EXCLUSION IN EAR-
LY NEw ENGLAND 1 (2012).
156. See, for example, id. at 2, where Goodman claims that the very act of excluding some people
reinforces the cohesion of those who remain within the community boundary (citing
CHARLES TILLY, IDENTITIES, BOUNDARIES, AND SOCIAL TIES 174 (2005)).
157. NICK CROSSLEY, KEY CONCEPTS IN CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY 8 (2005).
158. See Norbert L. Kerr, Norms in Social Dilemmas, in SOCIAL DILEMMAS: PERSPECTIVES ON INDI-
VIDUALS AND GROUPS 31, 33 (David A. Schroeder ed., 1995).
159. K T. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 4 (1966).
16o. JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 103 (1989).
161. ERIKSON, supra note 159, at 4.
162. Id. at 11.
163. Id. at 13. Kelley has observed that when people "opt out of ... general social constraints and
individually tailor their particular interactions by mutual consent ... [t]he community ben-
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however, the definition of "deviance" is endogenous to the group; it "is not a
property inherent in any particular kind of behavior; it is a property conferred
upon that behavior by the people who come into direct or indirect contact with
it."164
Importantly, deviance is "a relevant figure in the community's overall divi-
sion of labor."l 6s It formalizes a "degree of diversity ... to survey [the commu-
nity's] potential [and] measure its capacity"166 to cope with evolving circum-
stances. That is, the community needs confrontations over contested behavior
to decide what it wishes to label deviant. Consequently, when community cir-
cumstances change, responding to deviants gives the opportunity to redefine
the significance of behavior, thus adapting boundaries to keep pace with cur-
rent community needs. Further, the opportunity to participate in formal cere-
monies to deal with offenders and to confer the status of deviance or compli-
ance on contested behavior invests group members with the influence over
norms that is essential to community maintenance. 6
Tort law replicates the processes that sociological communities use to culti-
vate, reshape, and signal social norms in areas where the political community at
large has expressed no specific outcome preference.1 6' A defendant engages in
efits ... [because] avenues for experimentation and change are opened up; and the common
good is promoted because members of the community are free to adopt specially-tailored
patterns of interaction to achieve their perceived goods." Kelley, supra note 37, at 333-34. Or,
as George Bernard Shaw put it: "The reasonable man adapts himself to the world: the un-
reasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore all progress de-
pends on the unreasonable man." GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, MAN AND SUPERMAN 238 (Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1915) (1903).
164. ERIKSON, supra note 159, at 6.
165. Id. at 19.
166. Id.
167. See McMillan & Chavis, supra note 149, at ii.
168. This Article describes this process as one of "community construction," specifically of identi-
fying, applying, and signaling norms in an individual verdict and then allowing the response
to that verdict outside of the legal mechanism itself to add to the normative information that
will be identified and applied in subsequent, related cases. Although describing a concept as
"socially constructed" is often a political wedge to question the legitimacy of the concept, see
Paul A. Boghossian, What Is Social Construction?, TIMEs LITERARY SUPPLEMENT (Feb.
23, 2001), http://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/private/what-is-social-construction [http://
perma.cc/DP9X-4PVF], I do not intend the word to be used in that sense here, but rather as
a shorthand for the operational role of tort in the sociological community. Of course, any
community at any point in time is dependent on contingencies and thus "constructed" in the
more political sense of the word. The fact that tort specifically provides liability "placehold-
ers" prevents it from privileging any contingent construction that is out of keeping with
evolving community needs.
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some type of behavior that need not be inherently deviant, but regarding which
some plaintiff- claiming an injury based on his understanding of the integrity
assigned to him by the community -confronts him. Jurors are drawn from the
community to participate in the confrontation and to either approve or disap-
prove of the defendant's behavior. Jury verdicts confer upon the defendant's
behavior the status of deviancy or compliance. 169 Finally, individualized ver-
Further, although tort law in specific cases provides justice as between individuals, over
time its function is to allow for community construction. That is, a particular verdict not on-
ly resolves a dispute between plaintiff and defendant, but also drives a dialectic among those
outside the dispute. To use an analogy suggested (though not endorsed) by John Goldberg,
tort law can be likened to a bulletin board, with individual verdicts acting as bills posted
thereon, which informs viewers of their peers' intuitions about interpersonal behavioral ob-
ligations. Cf John C.P. Goldberg, Community and the Common Law Judge: Reconstructing
Cardozo's Theoretical Writings, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1324, 1348 (1990) (explaining that Judge
Cardozo thought judges "serve[d] their communities by helping the citizenry elaborate, or-
der, and examine prevalent moral intuitions, even as those intuitions [were] in dispute and
in a state of flux").
169. Scholars have acknowledged the unique competence of the jury to infuse the law with "the
community climate of values." Mark P. Gergen, TheJury's Role in Deciding Normative Issues in
the American Common Law, 68 FoRDHAM L. REV. 407, 436 n.128 (1999) (quoting Leon
Green, Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE L.J. 482, 483 (1956)). The jury is also a vehicle
for the importation of "popular culture" into legal processes. Id. (citing Fleming James, Jr.,
Functions of Judge and jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667, 685-87 (1949)). In early
American history, the jury was given significant latitude in adjudicating cases because it was
seen as "embodying the common sense of ordinary members of the community." Douglas G.
Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts ofJury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 377, 445
(1996). Jury instructions were vague, broad, or nonexistent. Id. at 441-42. Directed verdicts
were rare. Id. at 443-44. Perhaps most important, American juries were often authorized- by
state constitution, by statute, or by judicial decision -to resolve both factual issues and legal
issues. Id. at 446-48. It is no surprise that as tort theory veered toward instrumentalism,
procedural changes enhanced the judicial role. "Between 1850 and 1931, courts in at least
eleven states rejected the notion that juries had the power to pass on issues of law as well as
issues of fact." Id. at 451. Despite this evolution, juries still hold considerable power to weigh
in on whether contested behavior is normatively acceptable. For example, juries are generally
instructed that negligence results when behavior diverges from that of a "reasonable person"
in the situation, inviting them to announce what the community expects from its members.
Steven Hetcher, The jury's Out: Social Norms' Misunderstood Role in Negligence Law, 91 GEO.
L.J. 633, 649-651 (2003).
If, as a descriptive matter, tort law is best understood as a device for constructing
community then, as a prescriptive matter, refining the procedure that governs the jury's role
might improve the operation of tort. See, e.g., infra notes 345-349 and accompanying text. Of
course, it is entirely possible that a jury will signal "incorrectly" in a given case, so that its
apprehension of the community norm provokes hostility when announced. It is not neces-
sarily an indication that the jury has failed in its community-constructing job just because
the flawed signal demands a corrective response, which can take the form of public dialogue
(for instance, news coverage and public response thereto) or a contrary jury verdict in a sub-
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dicts are arrived at and announced publicly, messaging to those similarly situ-
ated how the community expects them to act in similar circumstances. 17 0 Im-
portantly, tort - unlike criminal law promulgated by the political community -
stops short of identifying behavior as impermissible. And unlike the criminal
law, it does not physically remove even liable defendants from the community.
Instead, it attaches a price to the defendant's behavior but permits him to re-
main at large. He can repeat his act if he feels circumstances warrant it, and is
willing to forfeit a money payment if community members disagree with him
in an eventual lawsuit. This flexible response of private law to sociological de-
viancy incentivizes mavericks to "venture out to the edges of the group," there-
by raising opportunities to reconsider social norms over time."' Allowing pri-
vate contestations to send normative signals to the community means that tort
law can be more agile than the cumbersome machinery of the state in keeping
pace with change, be it moral, economic, or technological.
Robert Post has observed this precise dynamic as both a function and a
consequence of defamation doctrine.172 One dimension of the right to reputa-
tion enshrined in defamation law is a right to dignity. Because dignity is, in
large part, contingent on the regard of third parties for the plaintiff, a plaintiff
suing for defamation is essentially polling the community about their relative
tolerance for each party's behavior. That is, did the defendant break community
codes by spreading a falsehood to community members that would cause them
to exile the plaintiff, or did the plaintiff break community codes with behavior
that justified his exile? Regardless of the outcome, the verdict "will demarcate
the boundaries of community membership."" While the process is especially
prominent in defamation because the injury by definition requires a third-party
sequent and similar case. In fact, such a signal allows the community or legislature to collec-
tively revise their norms. Of course, appellate judges can also override jury verdicts they per-
ceive as clearly "incorrect." Although judicial review may "fix" a specific verdict, it might
simultaneously diminish the community-constructing potential of tort because it short-
circuits the opportunity and responsibility of the community to weigh in on the appropriate
norm. See, e.g., supra note 168 (referring to Goldberg's description of jury verdicts as posts
on a community "bulletin board").
170. See, e.g., Scott Hershovitz, Tort as a Substitute for Revenge, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF THE LAW OF TORTS 86, 96-98 (J. Oberdiek ed., 2014) (explaining that one purpose of tort
law is to enable an injured plaintiff to send a message to society at large that the defendant
acted wrongfully and must recognize the plaintiff's relational standing by compensating him
for the wrong).
171. ERIKSON, supra note 159, at ii.
172. See Post, Defamation, supra note 132, at 713.
173. Id.
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community witness to the tortious behavior, the same essential pattern is on
display throughout tort.
Similarly, tort for centuries recognized causes of action for "alienation of
affection,' "seduction," and the like.171 Over time, most American communities
grew more tolerant of infidelity and similar behavior. If this behavior had been
relegated solely to criminal law treatment, legislators facing re-election might
have been reluctant to formally condone it by changing the criminal law. But
because it was treated primarily through tort, juries could, on an individual and
incremental basis, simply find for defendants, thus accreting to a new social
norm that lifted the taboo on extramarital relationships. Once the stigma on
the behavior had faded, many legislatures acceded to the new norm by disa-
bling these common law causes of action. 17s However, so-called "heartbalm"
causes of action remain viable in North Carolina, where the sociological com-
munity continues to prefer a norm against this behavior and the political com-
munity has remained inert. And the process may work in the inverse: political
communities may grow disenchanted with an outdated social norm that has
become entrenched as a matter of tort doctrine assigned to the court (and thus
resistant to community input), and they may respond by promulgating a pub-
lic law that takes the matter out of the common-law realm. Prime examples in-
clude statutory abrogations of the fellow servant rule1 76 and the adoption of so-
called guest statutes'77 to govern liability of car drivers to injured passengers.1 7 "
C. Toggling Between Different Sociological Communities
Tort law is a formal device by which the state provides a procedural appa-
ratus for sociological communities to construct themselves by identifying and
communicating interpersonal behavioral norms. As a result, the operation of
tort law is best understood by considering the various types of configurations
sociological communities can take. Sociologists have identified two distinct
types of community. "Traditional" groups are marked by familiar, interpersonal
174. See, e.g., Jean M. Cary & Sharon Scudder, Breaking Up Is Hard To Do: North Carolina Refuses
To End Its Relationship with Heart Balm Torts, 4 ELON L. REv. 1, 12-14 & n.86 (2012).
175. See id. at 14 & nn.82-86 (detailing the legislative and judicial dismantling of these torts).
176. See, e.g., Ala. Great S. R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 805 (Ala. 1892).
177. See, e.g., Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 3 9 4 (N.Y. 1969).
178. It is no accident that classic choice-of-law cases often feature disputes over emerging eco-
nomic or technological realities that two states are adapting to at different speeds. Note,
Bundled Systems and Better Law, 129 HARv. L. REv. 544, 552 (2015).
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relationships based on shared values. "Modern" groups are marked by imper-
sonal relationships based on rational consensus."
Ferdinand Tonnies denoted the traditional community as Gemeinschaft
and the modern community as Gesellschaft.1 so Emile Durkheim suggested a
similar dichotomy between community types in The Division of Labor in Society.
He observed that "undifferentiated" communities -where each member self-
sufficiently took care of most food, clothing, and shelter needs on his own -
thwarted division of labor and specialization. Members were forced into "mul-
tiplex" relationships that spanned numerous endeavors such as trade, farming,
worship, and family."' In contrast, "differentiated" communities were prem-
ised on the development of specialized means of economic support, the devel-
opment of impersonal, transaction-specific relationships, and the latitude to
hold pluralistic points of view."' Traditional communities premised on same-
ness and multiplex relationships typically share religious or moral orientations.
They coordinate private relationships through social norms derived from a
shared intersubjective notion of the good.' In contrast, modern communities
are premised on specialization of labor and relationships, and on a plurality of
cultural and value orientations. As a result, modern communities coordinate
through "rational" or efficient behavioral norms.184
Interestingly, because sociologists began to theorize "community" during
the Industrial Revolution, the rapid changes of the period influenced the way
that they categorized different groups. The structural characteristics that
179. See, e.g., FERDINAND TONNIES, ON GEMEINSCHAFT AND GESELLSCHAFT (Charles Loomis
trans., 1957), reprinted in MARCELLO TRUZzI, SOCIOLOGY: THE CLASSIC STATEMENTS 145-54
(1971).
18o. Id.
181. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIvIsION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 70-110 (George Simpson trans.,
1933).
182. See id. at 111-33.
183. See, e.g., Jonathan Haidt & Jesse Graham, Planet of the Durkheimians: Where Community, Au-
thority, and Sacredness Are Foundations of Morality, in JOHN T. JOST ET AL., SOCIAL AND PSY-
CHOLOGICAL BASES OF IDEOLOGY AND SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION 371 (2009) (explaining that a
key component of closed Gemeinschaft communities was "shared mind or belief"); see also
C.J. Calhoun, Community: Toward a Variable Conceptualization for Comparative Research, 5
Soc. HisT. 105, 1o6 (1980) (explaining that early sociologists understood Gemeinschaft-type
communities to be "moral in that people were ... better integrated into webs of social com-
mitments, rules and relations," even if they were not paragons as individuals).
184. See Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 127 (H.
Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1948). Legal anthropologist Henry Sumner Maine referred to
closed communities as societies of "status;' which he contrasted with modern communities
known as societies of "contract." HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION
WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 151 (1861).
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seemed to be determinative of Gemeinschaft communities - geographic insu-
larity, population density, the built environment -may have been overempha-
sized because of "connotations specific to [the] historical context."1 5 Many so-
ciologists now agree that communities are a function of substantive factors:
dense social networks, small group size, a perceived similarity of life experi-
ence, and "common beliefs in an idea system, a moral order, an institution, or a
group." 186 Common sense suggests that some of these substantive characteris-
tics are more likely to flourish in tandem with structural factors, such as geo-
graphic insularity and economic simplicity. And typically, these insular and
simple communities precede their more complex successors. So the labels "tra-
ditional" and "modern" have been affixed to them, although the animating
difference between them seems to be how they integrate inconsistent values
and points of view. In other words, a Gemeinschaft organization is compara-
tively closed to external influences that could disrupt its shared values, while a
Gesellschaft organization is open to the inputs and to the fluidity of group val-
ues."' This distinction between "closed" and "open" communities has been
documented in anthropological literature and captures both the structural and
substantive characteristics of the two types of community that sociologists have
identified.' Consequently, this Article will refer primarily to "closed" and
"open" communities to signify traditional, local groups and modern, national
groups, respectively.
Although Durkheim, Tbnnies, and others recognized that a community
could organize in two distinct fashions, they did not see the two types of socio-
logical configurations as mutually exclusive. Rather, they were merely "con-
trasted tendencies within society at any one time."'18  Many sociologists agree
that closed communities may be "nested" within open communities. So while
185. Calhoun, supra note 183, at 1os; see also Stephen Vaisey, Structure, Culture, and Community:
The Search for Belonging in 5o Urban Communities, 72 AM. Soc. REv. 851, 853-54 (2007). More
important than structural factors, Vaisey suggests, are substantive dynamics, namely "ideas,
culture, and identity." Vaisey, supra, at 54.
186. Steven Brint, Gemeinschaft Revisited: A Critique and Reconstruction of the Community Concept,
19 Soc. THEORY 1, 3-4 (2001).
187. See, e.g., Vaisey, supra note 185, at 854 (citing Amitai Etzioni, Is Bowling Together Sociologically
Lite?, 30 CONTEMP. Soc. 223; 223-24 (2001)).
i88. See, e.g., Dick A. Papousek, The Openness of a Closed Community, 1 IBERO-AMERiKANISCHES
ARCHIV 245, 246 (1975) (positing that open and closed communities exist on a spectrum and
can be best measured in terms of their "external relations").
i89. COHEN, supra note 131, at 24. Anthony Cohen explains that the ascendance of sociologists
participating in the "Chicago School" used Durkheim's distinction to further their agenda of
separating urban and rural societies and thus described the two types of community as mu-
tually exclusive rather than complementary.
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the superficial homogeneity within an open community may lead to the as-
sumption that closed communities have become "redundant and anachronis-
tic," national orthodoxy may actually "mask[] real and significant differences at
a deeper level.""'o Indeed, it may become more important for closed communi-
ties to reassert their coherence in the face of this external pressure.191 Further,
because closed and open communities can coexist, sociologists have explained
that both kinds of sociological norms-moral and efficient-must be freely
available in cases of interpersonal conflict in order to incentivize appropriate
behavior within different kinds of community. 192
19o. Id. at 44.
191. Id.
192. Cohen explains that, according to Weber, " [e]fficiency, the 'ethic of ultimate ends', must be
tempered by, and married to, compassion, 'an ethic of responsibility,"' and that these two
ethics "are not absolute contrasts but rather supplements." Id. at 24 (quoting Weber, supra
note 184, at 127). The sociological observation of a "situational toggle" used to flip between
different normative orientations is congruent with recent neuroethical findings. Scientists
have tested subjects using multiple variations of the so-called Trolley Problem, a well-
known device for exploring the spectrum of neuroethical responses to human conflict. See,
e.g., Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395 (1985). The basic premise
of the problem is that an out-of-control trolley is on a collision course to hit five workmen;
if the trolley continues on its track, the five men will be killed. Researchers have found that
if subjects are asked whether they would push onto the track a person standing next to them
on a bridge in order to halt the trolley and save five lives (at the expense of one), most will
decline. JosHuA GREENE, MORAL TRIBES 120-22 (2013). However, when asked if they would
flip a switch to divert the train down a sidetrack holding a single person, most answer yes
even though the net result is the same: one life taken and five lives spared. Id. Finally, when
bilingual subjects are asked whether they would push someone onto the tracks, they are
more likely to answer "yes" when they read the problem in their second language than when
they read the problem in their native language. Albert Costa et al., Your Morals Depend on
Language, 9 PLOS ONE e94842 (2014). In short, when the decision maker has a more prox-
imate relationship to the decision, he is likely to invoke morality norms, but as he grows re-
mote from the decision, he toggles to utility norms.
Neuropsychologists have explained these responses as a result of brain function. The
dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex of the brain handles cognitive control, while the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex of the brain enables emotional response. Studies using MRI scanning have
shown that when the Trolley Problem is presented as a "personal" dilemma, the ventrome-
dial cortex shows increased activity and the individual experiences an emotional response-
namely, that pushing an individual to his death is morally wrong. Joshua Greene et al., An
fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment, 293 SCIENCE 2105 (2001). But
when the Trolley Problem is presented as an "impersonal" dilemma, the dorsal lateral cortex
activity spikes and yields a less emotional and more purely cognitive response -forfeiting
one life to save five is an efficient use of the resources at hand. Id. In a similar experiment
comparing the response of patients with frontotemporal dementia-a condition impairing
the ventromedial cortex-against those of Alzheimer's patients and healthy patients, only
twenty percent of Alzheimer's and healthy patients would physically push the single man to
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D. Sociological Community in the United States
The development of sociological community in the United States has fol-
lowed the classic path described by sociologists. In the colonial and antebellum
period, the United States was a collective of traditional, closed communities. By
the close of the nineteenth century, economic and technological changes
spurred the development of an overarching open community. By the twentieth
century, it became clear that closed communities would continue to exist, nest-
ed within the open community. Many Americans belong simultaneously to the
national, open community and to one or more closed communities.
1. Early American Community
In the colonial and antebellum period, multiple traditional communities
developed in the United States. Their economies were largely agricultural; they
were highly insular, with little interaction outside their immediate boundaries;
and they tended to be organized around a shared purpose that dictated a cohe-
sive set of values, whether that purpose was religion or enterprise.
Most of the colonial economies were "overwhelmingly agricultural."' As a
result, concentrated urban settings were scarce, land ownership was a crucial
component of community membership and movement away from inherited
land was uncommon. These towns were "self-consciously" founded as com-
munities, with "town fathers" distributing land only to those who had
save the five, while sixty percent of frontotemporal dementia patients would do so. Mario F.
Mendez et al., An Investigation of Moral Judgement in Frontotemporal Dementia, 18 COGNITrVE
& BEHAV. NEUROLOGY 193 (2005).
Notably, studies suggest that "utilitarian judgments made in the face of competing
emotional responses require the application of (additional) cognitive control," because
"[o] ne has to apply a decision rule in the face of a competing impulse." GREENE, supra, at
127. Not surprisingly, "people who generally favor effortful thinking over intuitive thinking
are more likely to make utilitarian judgments, and . .. utilitarian judgment is associated with
better cognitive control abilities." Id. at 128. Jonathan Haidt and coauthors have documented
that individuals who are identified as political liberals or libertarians are more comfortable
with moral trade-offs like those highlighted in the Trolley Problem, while political conserva-
tives "are more often drawn to deontological moral systems in which one should not break
moral rules even when the consequences would, overall, be positive." Jesse Graham, Jona-
than Haidt & Brian A. Nosek, Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Diferent Sets of Moral Foun-
dations, 96 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1029, 1037 (2009).
193. WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 1 (1975).
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"demonstrat[ed] the requisite fitness of character and belief," while preventing
the sale of land to outsiders.194
This structure resulted in great insularity. Social and economic relation-
ships were largely confined within the community.9 Residents tended to op-
erate according to existing status hierarchies 196 and because of limited commu-
nication channels were largely unaware of how life unfolded in other groups. 97
Residents rarely sought to alter their lots in life by moving, preferring instead
to work within existing structures and boundaries.198
Finally, individual communities tended to share cohesive sets of values
unique to their groups. Interpersonal friction was managed largely by reliance
on "local customs and standards of neighborliness," which were often unwrit-
ten and therefore not understood or followed by outsiders.' 99 For example,
Massachusetts merchants were expected to charge prices considered "just" by
communal standards,200 whereas the prevailing ethic in Virginia emphasized
seeking individual commercial advantage.201 In sum, American "communities"
in the antebellum period were organized as closed groups; there was a great
homogeneity of values within each community but a great heterogeneity of val-
ues between them.
2. Modern American Community
Not long after the Revolution, the United States entered a period of pro-
found modernization. The economy shifted its emphasis from agriculture to
commerce, the population began to migrate and reduce the insularity of local
communities, and as select hubs grew more heterogeneous and communica-
tions technology improved, the paradigm of unified community values weak-
ened.
194. Bruce H. Mann, Rationality, Legal Change, and Community in Connecticut, 1690-176o, 14 LAw
&Soc'Y REV. 187, 2o8-o9 (1980).
195. Bruce H. Mann, Law, Legalism, and Community Before the American Revolution, 84 MICH. L.
REV. 1415, 1436 (1986).
196. RiCHARD D. BRowN, MODERNIZATION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LIFE 16oo-
1865, at 55 (1976).
197. Id. at 53.
198. Mann, supra note 194, at 193.
199. DAVID THOMAS KONIG, LAW AND SOCIETY IN PURITAN MASSACHUSETTS: EssEx COUNTY,
1629-1692, AT 68 (1979).
200. BROWN, supra note 196, at 37-38.
201. Id. at 37, 43-44.
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Ten new states joined the union between 1790 and 1820, easing access to
vast fertile expanses of land.20 2 Farms in the newly opened Western region
sparked the demand for transportation such as railroads and canals to take
goods to market, which in turn led to "market farming" and price competi-
tion.2 03 New Englanders began to shift from agriculture to manufacturing.20 4
The advent of the assembly line changed production of goods such as textiles,
clocks, nuts, bolts, typewriters and sewing machines. As a result, the American
economy grew increasingly specialized and a mass market for consumer goods
developed.205
Means of communication also evolved rapidly. Newspapers multiplied,
from seventeen operating in the colonies in 1760 to ninety-two in 1790.206
These newspapers tended to focus on state, national, and international news,
with local news still transmitted through "traditional, face-to-face conversa-
tion." 20 7 Telegraphs were introduced in the mid-nineteenth century, making
possible instantaneous communications across large distances between people
in markedly different circumstances.2 08
By the 1830s, "new social patterns" in the country reflected the emergence
of a modern American personality, marked by social, economic, and political
ambition and a declining deference to traditional authority structures. 209 This
new American personality translated into a new tier of American community,
one whose shared practices and relationships spanned geographic, religious,
and cultural boundaries.2 10
202. Id. at lo6-07.
203. Id. at 124.
204. Id. at 127.
205. Id. at 136-37.
206. Id. at 109.
207. Id.
208. John Robinson Thomas, Legal Responses to Commercial Transactions Employing Novel Com-
munications Media, 9o MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (1992).
209. BRowN, supra note 196, at 95.
210. "In the middle decades of the century, from the 1820's through the 186o's, [Americans'] turn
to supralocal, and especially national, involvement was to accelerate sharply. Economic
changes gave a new relevance to thinking on a national scale. By means of the revolution in
transportation the integration of the United States economy across regional lines was sub-
stantially completed during these years. A national structure of production, marketing, and
consumption became dominant. This modernization of the economic structure promoted a
more complete realization of the modern personality among Americans." Id. at 123.
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3. Nested American Community
By early 1861, "all geographic sections [of the country] shared a wide varie-
ty of common attitudes and interests."2 1 ' "[C]ommon American values and
patterns of behavior were emerging." At the same time, however, traditional
communities with a range of insular cultural preferences continued to exist.2 13
Unsurprisingly, the coexistence of an open national community with closed
local communities was most pronounced in the South. While the nationaliza-
tion of the economy, transportation, and community did reach the region, it
did not penetrate as fully as in the North. This was a product of both geogra-
phy and culture. Because Southern products were not high-volume goods, the
region did not construct as many railroads and thus did not fully integrate
within the national economic network.2 14
Further, the kinds of population-diverse and communication-rich urban
centers that typically sprung up at commercial ports were less common in the
South. Consequently, "[t] he mass of the Southern white population remained
comparatively ignorant and isolated from knowledge of the world outside their
own county."2 15 Southern communities were more apt to be organized tradi-
tionally, with clearly defined and entrenched status roles.2 16
In short, while an open community was clearly ascendant, closed commu-
nities persisted, relying on their own intersubjective notions of "the good
life."217 The national ethos tended to value productivity through rational calcu-
lation, and many local communities followed suit. But some communities re-
tained a "subculture" premised on distinct values, including the more tradi-
tional idea that privileged members of society were entitled to honor and were
211. Id. at 148.
212. Id. at 149.
213. Id. at 147. Of course, one malignant example of this nesting was the persistence of slavery in
local enclaves. The "sectional political crisis" that led to the Civil War has been attributed in
part to increasing sociological modernization and the move towards an anti-slaveholding
culture in the North. Id. at 123; see id. at 170-73. The abolition of slavery and the subsequent
passage of statutes to protect civil rights are examples of the political community exercising
its authority to adopt positive law that supersedes sociological community practices.
214. Id. at 143.
215. Id. at 141-42.
216. See id. at 144 (indicating that low literacy rates in the South "supported deferential behavior"
and that farmers "often relied on merchants to keep track of their credit").
217. Id. at 146-47.
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bound to extend protection to those who depended on them.218 In short, com-
munity in the United States was, by the twentieth century, a two-tier proposi-
tion.
To summarize, when individuals conduct private interpersonal relation-
ships where the state has no direct stake, their behavior is shaped in large part
by social norms. These norms tend to be developed over time by sociological
communities. But sociological communities can take either an open or closed
configuration, and the resultant norms tend to be either efficient or moral, re-
spectively. Sociology suggests that individuals who may belong to more than
one community employ a situational toggle to choose between morality and
utility norms when making interpersonal behavioral choices, and neuroethi-
cists have confirmed this intuition. In the United States, which comprises mul-
tiple traditional communities nested within a single modern community, indi-
viduals participate in both types of community and adjust their behavior
accordingly to comply with relevant norms.
III. THE DOCTRINAL SIGNIFICANCE OF SOCIOLOGICAL COMMUNITY
Tort law is one mechanism by which communities survey their member-
ship for consensus on emerging issues and crystallize those views by announc-
ing a verdict. It invites members of the community sitting as jurors to assign
liability based on their normative assessment of whether a duty was owed and
was delivered, and to signal that norm to other group members. As similar ver-
dicts accrete or diverge over time,21 the common law tort system establishes
just the kind of sociological dialectic that communities depend on to retain
their consensus about interpersonal behavioral expectations.22
218. Id. at 143-44, 147, 186. Brown observes that "[o]nce a national representative government
existed and geographic mobility was such a prominent element of common experience, the
question of identity assumed new urgency for groups and individuals .... Some could be
satisfied with political boundaries, but there were always many who looked to religious and
ethnic ties or to common features of class, life style, and attitudes." Id. at 120.
219. See Balganesh & Parchomovsky, supra note 104, at 1267 (explaining that the common law is
able to adapt to social needs because judges "restat[e] the 'correct' version of the common
law [to achieve incremental changes] rather than . .. actively altering the law to create alto-
gether new rules").
220. See CROSSLEY, supra note 157, at 322 (explaining the sociological theory that socio-cultural
systems are "constituted through 'communicative action[,]"' by which members generally
abide by shared social norms until they reach a point where they "turn back upon their hab-
its and assumptions to subject them to a communicatively rational interrogation and evalua-
tion [otherwise known as discourse]," through which actors attempt to persuade other
community members to shift to a different norm).
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This Part describes how tort doctrine allows the construction of both closed
and open communities. First, it examines American cases from the antebellum
to the modern period to reveal a body of law that prizes normative flexibility.
Early cases rely on community morality to supply normative information about
interpersonal duties, while later cases move fluidly between local morality and
national utility to reflect the configuration of the community where the disput-
ed injury arose. As a descriptive matter, tort doctrine deployed in individual
cases has implicitly encouraged decision makers to toggle between the norms
of closed and open communities from case to case to reflect the group within
which the injury was inflicted.
The Restatement features the same consistent deference to "community" as
the source of normative expectations about interpersonal behavior. By concep-
tualizing community as sociological, rather than political, the Restatement in-
vites decision makers to draw information from whichever tier of community is
the site of the dispute. Injuries inflicted within closed communities are to be
assessed based on that community's norm (typically moral in nature), while in-
juries inflicted within the open community are to be assessed based on that
community's norm (typically efficient).
Unfortunately, by obscuring this process of normative toggling, doctrine
has perpetuated the theoretical confusion about tort law's purpose. Conse-
quently, this Part concludes by suggesting that tort doctrine should highlight
its capacity to toggle between community norms. Embracing the normative
toggle offered by doctrine would resolve the intramural debate over tort law's
purpose by recognizing the legitimacy of both moral justice and economic effi-
ciency as tools of constructing different communities.
A. Community in Case Law
Cases decided by American courts from the colonial period through the
modern period reveal that community has consistently been the source of in-
formation about interpersonal liability norms. Without explicitly recognizing
or operationalizing the process, the cases reflect a commitment to sociological
community and an understanding that it can exist in two distinct configura-
tions. While the early cases reference community and default to an application
of local norms, the modern cases reference community and then intuitively
reach for either local norms or national norms depending on the scope of the
injury involved.
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1. The Colonial and Antebellum Period
Colonial and antebellum communities tended to be agricultural and insu-
lar, with highly developed customs and norms that reflected shared morality,
religion, or social values.221 Tort adjudication during this period contributed to
the solidarity of these communities by discerning and announcing norms while
allowing for continual reevaluation of whether the norms remained desirable as
circumstances evolved.. Contrary to the popular account,222 there was a sub-
stantial tort docket in the colonies and the post-Revolutionary states. 2 23 These
221. See, e.g., supra Section II.D.1.
222. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 18, at 3 (explaining that the standard account holds that tort
emerged as an independent branch of law in the late nineteenth century, as a response to in-
dustrialization, but that the process was more complex than that account suggests); see also
Gary T. Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 641, 641-42
(1989) (explaining that many tort historians claim that "nineteenth-century tort law wit-
nessed a major vindication of negligence . . . to provide subsidies for emerging industry").
223. See, e.g., Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Common-Law Background of Nineteenth-Century Tort
Law, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1128 (1990) (documenting that a "fault-based system of tort law
was established by the eighteenth century"). Notably, the prevalence of "tort" has been ob-
scured because private injury cases had for some time been categorized according to the writ
by which a plaintiff would sue. The writ of trespass became the primary means for com-
plaining about non-contractual injuries. See EDWARD J. KIONKA, TORTS INA NUTSHELL 15 (3d
ed. 1999). Three types of trespass writ eventually developed: vi et armis (generally dealing
with injuries caused by the use of physical force), de bonis asportatis (generally dealing with
injuries caused by the taking of goods), and quare clausumfregit (generally dealing with inju-
ries caused by trespass to land). Id. at 16. Later, for those injuries that did not fit within any
of the trespass categories, individuals were allowed to bring actions for "trespass on the
case." Id. The "case" writ was the forum for most actions alleging compensable wrongs that
modern American law would describe as torts. Within case are found many of the nominate
or intentional torts, such as deceit, nuisance, defamation, interference with economic rela-
tions, malicious prosecution, and some complaints about abnormally hazardous activities.
Id. at 17-18. Trover later developed to address conversion and certain kinds of damage to
chattels. Id. at 18. Case also housed causes of actions that were essentially premised on negli-
gence. Id. A subset of case, assumpsit, dealt in part with careless execution of a promised
undertaking. Id. at 17. Thus, "[a]s early as 1374, a defendant's liability in assumpsit was
predicated on his failure to act with the care or skill the community expected of him'" Ka-
czorowski, supra, at 1131. American states formally adopted or "received" the English com-
mon law, including the law governing injury actions, through constitutional provisions or
by statute. See Andrew J. King, The Law of Slander in Early Antebellum America, 35 Am. J. LE-
GAL HIST. 1, 6 n.18 (1991). The difficulty in devising a justificatory theory of U.S. tort law
has likely been aggravated by an historical account that omits the first century of infor-
mation about its practice. Kaczorowski's study of common-carrier liability is illuminating in
tracing the multiple causes of action during the pre-Industrial period that assigned liability
based on a determination that interpersonal duty had been neglected, but which are not typ-
ically slotted as "tort" cases in part because scholars had not yet grouped the various writ-
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cases involved highly personal disputes between litigants known to each other
and to their neighbors. In fact, during this formative period when state gov-
ernment was in its infancy, local courts were deputized to mediate in accord
with "the general popular sense of right."224 Tort served as a stabilizing force
because "[c]ommunities, organized in terms of mutual responsibilities, used
courts to punish social deviance."225 Tort doctrine invoked "community" as the
source of liability norms across all three liability headings: nominate, strict, and
negligent.
a. Intentional Tort. Although the intentional torts can be described as the
most "formal" and constrained of the three tort categories, their open-textured
elements still required the importation of "community" values in order to de-
termine liability. For example, in an assault case where the defendant attacked a
man for turning his "employer and patron" against him, the court limited the
plaintiff to nominal damages because the community disapproved of his ma-
nipulative behavior.22 6 In trespass torts, too, liability was contingent upon a vi-
olation of community values. Where a hunting party rode across "an old uncul-
tivated field, around which there had been a fence, but which was then down in
many places," the court declined to find a trespass.2 27 It acknowledged that
traversing unoccupied land would be considered a trespass in England, where
"almost every foot of soil is appropriated to some specific purpose," and there-
fore required protection from intruders.22 8 But in South Carolina, "the greater
part consists in uninclosed and uncultivated forest," and condoning suits for
every unauthorized crossing would "overwhelm us in a sea of petty litigation,
destructive of the interests and peace of the community."2 29 In a case where a
creditor repossessed land that the borrower had been leasing to a third party
and gave the third party permission to remain, the borrower was found liable
224. Paul Samuel Reinsch, The English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, in SELECT Es-
SAYS IN ANGLO-AMERiCAN LEGAL HISTORY 412 (Ass'n of Am. Law Schs. ed., 1907).
225. King, supra note 223, at 6.
226. Dinkins v. Debruhl, 1n S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 85, 87 (1819). Notably, in this case the victim
pressed state criminal charges and the assailant was imprisoned and fined; the victim then
brought the tort suit for assault. Id. at 85-86. The diverging results -a guilty verdict fol-
lowed by a specified punishment compared with a liability verdict in which the judge essen-
tially excused the assailant -illustrate the use of public law to express a political communi-
ty's abstract intolerance of assaults and the use of private tort law to express a sociological
community's tolerance for assaults provoked by malicious interference with the employment
relationship.
227. Broughton v. Singleton, ii S.C.L. (2 Nott. & McC.) 338, 338-39 (1820).
228. Id. at 340.
229. Id.
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for trespass when he subsequently went onto the land and tried to evict the
tenant. 2 30 The court affirmed the liability, finding that the trespassers knew the
"rule[] of the law which is clear and generally understood in the community"
that they were barred from the property but that they thought they could enter
"with impunity on account of the poverty of the [tenant]." 23 These cases illus-
trate how tort doctrine was used to let communities identify deviancy and sig-
nal behavioral boundaries to group members.
b. Strict Liability. The use of "community" as a liability determinant also
appears in the antebellum strict liability context. The most common strict lia-
bility cases arose out of claims for damage and loss of goods shipped by com-
mon carriers. Common carriers were said to be liable for all such harms to
chattels regardless of their care. But community values were relevant even in
this category of tort liability-both to determine who should be categorized as
a common carrier and to determine when a loss was an "act of God" excepted
from strict liability. For example, where a local man contracted to carry some
goods on his wagon from the local rail depot to another location, the court
found he was not a common carrier because he was not in the regular business
of transporting goods. "An occasional undertaking to carry goods will not make
a person a common carrier; if it did, then it is hard to determine who, in a
planting and commercial community like ours [where most planters own wag-
ons], is not one," the court concluded.232 "Such a rule would be exceedingly in-
convenient to the whole community."233
In addition to defining the activities to be included in the strict liability cat-
egory, community practice and values also informed the scope of exceptions to
the strict liability rule for common carriers. Tort doctrine provided that com-
mon carriers were not strictly liable for damages to chattels resulting from "acts
of God." The rule itself was clear, but as one judge explained, "[t]he difficulty
[was] in the application, and much of that ar[ose] from confusion of ideas, as
to what is meant by the act of God."234 He defined the exception to strict liabil-
ity to include "physical causes ... such as winds, waves, lightnings, rocks and
shoals," but continued that the carrier would revert to liability if "proper pru-
dence and skill has [not] been exercised to avoid the effect of these physical
230. Reed v. Davis, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 216, 226 (1826).
231. Id. at 227.
232. Fish v. Chapman & Ross, 2 Ga. 349, 353-54 (1847).
233. Id. at 354; see also Alexander v. Greene, 7 Hill 533, 551 (N.Y. 1844) (noting that determining
whether steamboats are common carriers is of "great and increasing importance to the inter-
ests of the whole community").
234. Reaves v. Waterman, 29 S.C.L. (2 Speers) 197, 209 (Ct. App. 1843) (Evans, J., dissenting).
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causes."235 Determining whether a loss occasioned by physical causes should be
defined as a liability-free act of God or as a liability-triggering instance of fail-
ure to avoid an act of God often boiled down to questions of community cus-
tom and practice. For example, where a cotton shipment was lost after a camp-
fire was carried fifteen feet with the wind and ignited bales that had been
"partially burst[] open,"236 the court acknowledged that fire was a physical
cause, but that:
[i]t cannot be seriously contended that an ordinary wind blowing this
fire on the cotton is such an act of God as will exempt the carri-
er ... [because] the blowing of the wind is one of the most ordinary
operations of nature, and its springing up suddenly is of constant oc-
currence throughout the world, and in no country more frequent than
in Texas,
so that it could have been "easily resisted" by a community member expected to
know about wind and cotton. 2 3 7
Similarly, in a 1790 South Carolina case, a shipper argued that he should be
absolved of liability for damages to tobacco lost when his boat took on water
during a trip.238 He contended that "tempestuous weather" was the unavoida-
ble cause of the boat's mishap.239 But the jury rendered a verdict for the plain-
tiff-merchant, finding that "the breeze was not more than every man of com-
mon foresight could have guarded against," and that the shipper explicitly
disregarded the advice of journeymen at port that most shippers in the com-
munity used heavier anchors and placed tarps over the tobacco to make the
journey around Pinkney's Island successfully.24 0 Again, it appears that even in
antebellum strict-liability cases, doctrine allowed liability to fluctuate in tan-
dem with the specific geographic and commercial needs of different communi-
ties.
c. Negligence. Finally, "community" is found to be a significant source of lia-
bility information in the earliest negligence cases. For example, a plaintiff was
driving about ninety "fat cattle for the Boston Market" over a bridge in Ver-
235. Id.
236. Chevallier v. Straham, 2 Tex. 115, 116 (1847).
237. Id. at 124-25.
238. McClures v. Hammond, 1 S.C.L. (i Bay) 99, 97 (Cts. Com. P1. & Gen. Sess. 1790).
239. Id. at 97.
240. Id. at 98 (affirming jury verdict).
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mont, and lost several animals when the bridge gave way. 24 1 In determining
whether the company that operated the bridge was liable in negligence for the
farmer's loss, the court said the question was whether the bridge was "suffi-
cient."24 2 The open-textured standard of sufficiency was to be construed by as-
sessing whether the bridge "stands secure . .. for the purpose of passing, in
transacting any of the usual business of the community."24 This, in turn, raised
the questions whether it was usual for farmers in this community to drive nine-
ty cattle over the bridge at a time, whether the usual practice in such cases
called for limiting the number of cattle crossing at any one time, and whether
244this farmer followed that practice. In a case of industrial accident, the New
York Supreme Court defended the fellow servant rule preventing a finding of
employer negligence in the case of negligence by one worker that injured an-
other.24 5 The court reasoned that "when the rule is examined in the light of ex-
pediency, in connection with the business interests of the community, its neces-
sity and wisdom, as applied to strangers, are manifest... ""' Finally, in a
medical malpractice case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine determined the
scope of a negligent surgeon's liability to his patient in part by considering that
"[t]he practice of surgery is indispensable to the community" and that the rate
of pay in Maine was less than "what is paid in cities for similar services," justi-
fying a more modest verdict for acknowledged negligence.247
In sum, during the colonial and antebellum periods, American courts con-
sistently recognized that interpersonal tort liability was a product of sociologi-
cal community norms. Further, they were readily able to identify those norms.
Most interpersonal interactions took place within sociologically traditional
communities where values and culture were homogenous and easily discernible
by both the plaintiff and defendant, as well as the judge and the jury.
2. Doctrinal Pivot Points
After the Civil War, communication and transportation systems modern-
ized profoundly. As a result, individuals who lived in insular local communities
had increased opportunities to exchange information and goods with those in
241. Richardson v. Royalton & Woodstock Tpk. Co., 5 Vt. 580, 580 (1833).
242. Id. at 585.
243. Id.
244. See id. at 587.
245. Coon v. Syracuse & Utica R.R. Co., 6 Barb. 231, 238 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1849).
246. Id.
247. Howard v. Grover, 28 Me. 97, 101 (1848).
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248
other communities. This process led to a burgeoning sense of national iden-
tity. 24 9 Further, it grew increasingly common for remote parties to join in inter-
personal transactions within this emerging national community. Tort doctrine
might have been reduced to near irrelevance as a mechanism for identifying
behavioral expectations in these "modern" disputes if not for two landmark
opinions that adapted tort to this new layer of community. First, in MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co., 250 Judge Cardozo wiped out the requirement that a plaintiff
suing for injuries caused by a product be in privity with the maker of that
product. Cardozo observed that within traditional closed communities, where
artisans typically sold goods they had made or were familiar with, a conversa-
tion at the point of sale highlighting flaws or dangers was sufficient to dis-
charge community expectations of fair dealing and care.25 1 If the item were
eventually resold, the remote purchaser could not sue the original seller for the
intermediate owner's failure to pass on any warnings. But, he explained, it was
increasingly common for actors to sell items with the "added knowledge that
[they would] be used by persons other than the purchaser."25 2 In those cases,
both the original producer-seller and the ultimate purchaser or user were par-
ticipating in a relationship that gave rise to interpersonal obligations despite
their physical disconnect. Adapting tort doctrine to permit injury suits among
strangers allowed tort to continue determining social, interpersonal duties of
care even in the modern, open community.
248. See supra Section II.D.2.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 209-210.
250. ii1 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). The traditional privity requirement is illustrated by an 1845 Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court case that declined to hold a stagecoach owner liable for
injuries that resulted when a defective axle in his rig caused an accident. Ingalls v. Bills, 5o
Mass. (9 Met.) 1 (1845). The court reasoned that "in a community like ours," it was not prac-
tical to expect the artisan who crafted an axle to have any responsibility for a remote stranger
who eventually rode in the coach where the axle had been installed, and not practical to ex-
pect the coach operator to assume liability for the artisan's work. Id. at 14. But over a series of
cases involving injuries inflicted through more multiparty, mechanized economic transac-
tions-including telegraph transmission, see Thomas, supra note 208, at 1171; wholesale-
retail distribution of medicine, see Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852); and mass-
production and distribution of consumer goods such as coffee urns, see Statler v. Ray Mfg.
Co., 88 N.E. 1063, o64 (N.Y. 1909)-courts had begun to manipulate that requirement in
order to allow plaintiff recovery for egregious harms. MacPherson did away with judicial dis-
sembling by striking down the requirement altogether and courts across the nation followed
suit. In this respect, the common law outpaced the legislative process of devising auto safety
regulations.
251. MacPherson, iII N.E. at 1051-52.
252. Id. at 1053.
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A second crucial opinion, The TJ. Hooper,2s recognized that there might be
more than one "community" capable of supplying the social values that deter-
mined interpersonal duties of care. There, the owners of commercial goods
sued towboat owners for damaging their goods by negligently operating their
crafts during a storm. The court held that although the custom in the tradi-
tional, closed shipping community was not to equip all towboats with radio re-
ceivers that would intercept foul weather warnings, following that custom did
not insulate the owner from negligence liability.254 Observing that the law
might require more care than was customarily observed by a particular subset
of actors, the court essentially bifurcated the care question. It suggested that
where interpersonal behavior crossed outside of the closed community-as
here, where the shippers' decision ultimately harmed multistate commercial in-
terests - the relevant interpersonal value might be supplied by the modern,
open community. The TJ. Hooper can be understood as creating space for the
application of either closed community or open community values to deter-
mine interpersonal liability, depending on the scope of the injurious behavior
at issue.
Taken together, these two cases expanded tort law's capacity to render in-
terpersonal liability decisions. They permitted tort to adjudicate disputes
whether they were geographically proximate or geographically remote, and
they permitted tort to select from among more than one value norm as neces-
sary to set culturally appropriate behavioral expectations.
3. The Modern Period
By the mid-twentieth century, the United States had reached a fully mod-
ern period, in which most Americans identified with two tiers of community.25 5
Information and goods moved freely between people who were otherwise
strangers to each other, allowing for a vibrant national community. At the same
time, many individuals retained roots in a local community, living much of
their daily lives with and among people who shared geographic circumstance,
culture, and values. During this period, as in earlier historical periods, tort doc-
trine was deployed to allow members of community to resolve disputes in a
way that both drew from and contributed to the solidarity of those communi-
ties. As in the antebellum period, modern courts used "community" to locate
interpersonal liability norms in nominate, strict, and negligence and torts. But
253. 6o F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
254. Id. at 739-40.
255. See supra Section II.D.3.
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in the modern period, courts found within doctrine the room to make intuitive
choices about which community is to supply the relevant liability norm- the
local or the national.
a. Intentional Tort. Community has continued to be used as a liability metric
in modern intentional tort cases. But modern courts have intuitively toggled
between the norms of the traditional community and the modern community
to fit the scope of the case at hand. For example, a group of seven adult males
sued the Oregon school district where they had attended fifth grade between
1968 and 1984 on a respondeat superior theory for battery.256 The plaintiffs al-
leged that the teacher had gained their "trust, admiration and obedience, and
condition[ed] them to respect [him] as a person of authority."257 He eventually
fondled their genitals in front of the classroom, "assist[ed]" them in urinating,"
and touched them both inside and outside their clothing.25 8 In their attempt to
pursue the claim despite the expiration of the statute of limitations period, the
plaintiffs maintained that they had not "discovered" the battery until years later
because they did not fully appreciate at the time that it was offensive. 25 9 The
court observed that "the line between offensive and socially acceptable touching
... may be difficult to ascertain," and that offense is in part a function of com-
munity values. 26 0 The court then explained that the teacher had "befriended"
the boys' families, and "gained their trust, their permission to spend substan-
tial periods of time with plaintiffs, and the benefit of their instruction to their
sons to respect and comply with [his] authority and requests."26 1 In essence,
the court suggested that the boys' local community at the time was not alert to
the offensive nature of the teacher's relationship with the boys. The court went
on to identify the teacher's alleged behavior as "grooming," a tactic that has
come to widespread national attention in recent years.262 Applying the current
values of the national community that recognize how grooming can distort the
perceptions of child sex abuse targets, the court determined that the plaintiffs
could not have identified the touching at issue as offensive at the time.263 The
court concluded that although the discovery rule to determine the date a plain-
tiff should have known of his injury employs an objective standard, the injury
256. Doe 1 v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist., 297 P-3d 1287, 1290 (Or. 2013).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1292.
260. Id. at 1295-96.
261. Id. at 1290.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1294-95.
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at issue was in part a function of community expectations.264 Intuitively gravi-
tating towards the expectations and knowledge of the national community
with regard to the nature of child sex offenses, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs had no objective basis for appreciating the offensive nature of the
touching until years later. 265
b. Strict Liability. Courts adjudicating modern strict-liability cases also tog-
gle between different communities to determine the scope of interpersonal lia-
bility. For example, a plaintiff in the timber-rich state of Washington sued a lo-
cal timber mill for losses at his mink farm resulting from explosions necessary
to the construction of an access road for logging operations.266 The court held
that the explosions were not "ultrahazardous activity" subject to strict liability
because the timber-related blasting was "no more than a usual incident of the
ordinary life of the community."267 Similarly, parents who sued butane suppli-
ers and deliverers on a strict-liability theory after a deadly cabin explosion lost
because the court drew the liability norm from the local community.268 The
court reasoned that where "[t]here were over 200 customers of such butane gas
in [the King's County] community, and on ranches and outlying homes not ac-
cessible to a natural gas system[, t]his commodity has come into popular use
and is a necessity in such localities,' meaning that it could not be considered
ultrahazardous for the locale. 2 69 In contrast, when asked to hold that an oil
company's duty to handle its gasoline with care was not delegable to an inde-
pendent contractor delivering the commodity, a Kentucky court declined.270
Deciding whether a duty was nondelegable involved asking whether the re-
sponsibility in question "is so important to the community" that the employer
cannot transfer it to a third party. 271 The court reasoned that gasoline had be-
come commonplace in modern life, so the producer could therefore delegate its
duty of care.272
That the "community" relevant to assessing strict liability could be either a
closed community or an open community is underlined by a 1994 case where a
264. Id. at 1295-97.
265. Id. at 1297.
266. Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 268 P.2d 645, 645 (Wash. 1954).
267. Id. at 648.
268. Ambriz v. Petrolane, Ltd., 312 P.2d II, 16 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957), vacated on other grounds,
319 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1958).
269. Id.
270. Collins v. Liquid Transporters, 262 S.W2d 382 (Ky. 1953).
271. Id. at 383.
272. Id. at 382-83.
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motorcyclist argued that landowners should be held. strictly liable for the
placement of their standard mailbox near the edge of a highway drainage
ditch.273 The court explained that the riskiness of locating the box there was
contingent on "patterns of utility and morals in the life of the community."2 74
The court's allusion to both utility and morality suggests that it recognized two
possible communities whose values could supply the rule of interpersonal lia-
bility-the closed community and the open community. The court identified
the "rural nature of the accident site, construction of the mailbox, and location
of the mailbox in relation to the highway, shoulder, and drainage ditch" as the
relevant factors in community life.27s In effect, it defaulted to the liability
norms of the closed community without making this choice explicit.
c. Negligence. Modern cases also use community expectations as the metric
for liability in negligence. Here, too, they toggle between closed and open
communities when seeking the social norms that inform the assessment of in-
terpersonal liability. For example, when a man walking on a highway shoulder
"ordinarily used by pedestrians" was struck by the trailer of a truck going forty-
five miles per hour, the court had to determine whether that speed was reason-
able.276 The court found the answer by looking to the social norms of "the set-
tlement of Scottlandville, . . . a thicldy settled community."2 77 Because pedestri-
ans were known to use the road regularly, it was "the duty of the truck driver"
to keep the vehicle from the shoulder, the court concluded.27 8 Conversely, a
similar case from the same year elected the national community as the source of
liability norms.279 There, a pedestrian in Baltimore was using a "well worn"
and long-used footpath across the railway in another "thicldy settled" commu-
nity.280 The court refused to find the railroad negligent when a train struck him
without warning. It acknowledged that some courts required railroads to exer-
cise care in these circumstances, but suggested that interstate railroads should
be considered members of the national community and consequently subject to
more of an efficiency norm. "If [the railroad] owes a duty to every bare licensee
to run its trains with reference to him . .. it can do little else, its trains cannot
273. Olivier v. Boudreaux, 649 So. 2d 629, 629-30 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
274. Id. at 630 (quoting Entreviav. Hood, 427 SO. 2d 1146, 1150 (La. 1983)).
275. Id.
276. Cooper v. Kennard, 192 So. 534, 534 (La. Ct. App. 1939).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 536.
279. Jackson v. Pa. R.R. Co., 3 A.2d 719 (Md. 1939).
28o. Id. at 720.
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be on time and the traveling public must suffer,' the court reasoned.' In nei-
ther case did the court explicitly acknowledge that it was choosing between the
closed and open communities as the source of liability norms, even though the
election of the relevant community was dispositive of liability in both cases.
B. Community in the Restatement
American courts have long viewed tort as a community-constructing enter-
prise. Yet theorists have largely overlooked the role of community within this
body of law. This may be because a focus on tort outcomes and general liability
rules has obscured consideration of "the terms in which [courts] themselves
thought and wrote."28 2 Courts invoke the concept of community throughout
their analyses, even when that concept does not directly translate into outcomes
or rules. Therefore, one might ask whether the references to community un-
earthed throughout American tort cases are replicated in a more comprehensive
representation of tort doctrine. The linguistic analysis of the Restatement set
forth in Sections I.D and I.E confirms that they are. This Section examines in
more depth precisely how tort doctrine, as represented by the Restatement, priv-
ileges community as the source of liability norms. Further, it demonstrates how
doctrine has used references to community to allow for the importation of ei-
ther sociologically closed or sociologically open community norms as required
by the particulars of individual cases.
As explained above, tort doctrine is replete with "placeholder" words -
"reasonable'" "offensive," "ultrahazardous," and the like. Linguists describe
these "hedges" as devices to delegate to someone other than the writer or
speaker the job of interpreting what a word means in the abstract and, more
importantly, in application."' The most common use of "community" in the
Restatement suggests that decision makers can concretize the meaning of these
doctrinal "hedge" words in their application to actual cases. For example, the
281. Id. at 722.
282. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23, at 22. Posner acknowledges in The Economic Structure of
Tort Law that in analyzing his dataset of appellate court opinions in an earlier project, he had
considered just the outcome and the rule that could be extracted from the case. Id. (citing
Posner, supra note 52). He deepens his analysis in Economic Structure by expanding the scope
of research to include other secondary materials like the Restatement of Torts "as a source of
authoritative cases and doctrines." Id. at 20. But because "community" is often referenced in
opinion passages removed from the actual holding of cases, even this expanded project was
not well positioned to capture these references.
283. See, e.g., Paradis, supra note 41, at 170 ("'Reasonable' and various other modifiers that can be
broadly classed as 'hedges,' . . . delegate not only the extension of a word but its intension,
the criteria that define it in the abstract." (footnote omitted)).
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Restatement instructs that a defendant is not liable for use of a public highway
that crosses private land if his use was "reasonable," and then directs the deci-
sion maker to determine the concrete meaning of "reasonable" by comparing it
with the community's typical use of the same highway.284 Thus, doctrine dele-
gates to decision makers from the community the authority to ask how mem-
bers generally understand their obligations to share or refrain from sharing
public roads on private lands. The answer to this question will generally be
more accurate, and therefore better allow peaceful private ordering of interper-
sonal relationships, if it is the result of an on-the-ground calculus rather than a
top-down, one-size-fits-all rule given by the state. If county roads in the region
are plentiful and accessible, the community norm might view the use of public
highways that cross onto private land as intrusive. If alternate routes are less
attractive, the community may over the years have informally accepted that
neighbors who use the public roadway mean no intrusion, and such behavior
would not be understood as unreasonable.
Community is also invoked to extend the "hedge" word of negligence. For
example, the Restatement specifies that actors are negligent if they do not know
the qualities of humans, animals, things and forces "in so far as they are mat-
ters of common knowledge at the time and in the community." In a rece
example, a New Jersey court determined that an individual who sends text
messages to a recipient known to be driving may be liable for injuries that re-
sult from the driver's distraction.286 Here, the placeholder term "negligence"
was applied to import the increasingly common knowledge in the national
community that phones (things) distract drivers (humans) at the wheels of
speeding automobiles (things and forces). 8 But on a different topic, it is both
possible and appropriate that two distinct local communities would arrive at
two different decisions as to whether a particular behavior is negligent. For ex-
284. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 192 & cmt. d (AM. LAwINST. 1965).
285. Id. § 290.
286. Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
287. Of course, "common knowledge" in any particular community develops on an informal basis
and therefore cannot be tested against a rule supplied by the state, the market, or any deon-
tological authority. Interestingly, this case highlights questions about the comparative insti-
tutional competence of judges and jurors. In some instances, the very characteristics that
qualify judges to determine the law (advanced education and long-term, remunerative em-
ployment) inhibit their appreciation of community mores and render their determinations
on such questions more akin to state-supplied rules. But in other circumstances, they are as
well positioned as jurors to participate in "common knowledge." Here, where all of the judg-
es likely drive, use cell phones, and read news reports increasingly documenting the incom-
patibility of the two, they were more likely acting as typical community members than state
rule givers.
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ample, a driver who collided with a chair left near the curb of a public street
might be found non-negligent in most communities, where chairs are under-
stood to have no place on the road, but negligent in Chicago during February,
where chairs are commonly understood as a valid method of claiming a shov-
eled parking space after a snowstorm.2 88
In short, whenever the Restatement invokes community, it is seeking infor-
mation about what group members expect of one another in their interpersonal
relationships. This information can only be accessed if doctrine specifies the
groups whose expectations are relevant, and the majority of references to
"community" in the Restatement do just that. The Restatement never gives a sin-
gle explicit definition of "community." That kind of unitary definition would
defeat the intentional indeterminacy of the many adjectives that are used to set
liability standards ex ante. Neither does it leave community completely unde-
fined. That vagueness would make it impossible for decision makers to weigh
liability ex post in a given case. Instead, the Restatement alludes to different
kinds of communities that may be consulted as sources of normative expecta-
tions for interpersonal behavior. First, the Restatement suggests that the "com-
munity" relevant to tort law is. a sociological, rather than political, organization.
Next, the Restatement acknowledges that community may take shape locally or
nationally. Consequently, by referencing different kinds of communities as the
source of liability norms for different torts, doctrine invites tort decision mak-
ers to toggle between the norms of different communities depending on the in-
terpersonal conflict being adjudicated.
1. Political Community. Among the Restatement's forty-seven references to
community, a mere four are invocations of political community. In those four
references, the Restatement makes clear that what it is discussing is not a stand-
ard "community" for tort purposes, but something exceptional and different.
For example, in its treatment of intentional torts, the Restatement discusses
state legislation governing the appropriate private response to fires, observing
that these statutes may entitle private property owners to receive compensation
from "the organized community" a clear reference to the state as a political enti-
288. Commentators have suggested that negligence must be governed by a preexisting norm to
avoid "different conclusions as to the reasonableness of the same conduct." E.g., Kenneth S.
Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1187, 1202 (2001). But this insistence
overlooks the fact that conduct accepted by the community of a particular time and place
would be frowned on by the community of a different time or place. In other words, uni-
formity of result across distinct sociological communities might actually detract from the in-
terpersonal coordination function of tort within those communities.
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ty governing allocations from the public fisc.2 89 In its treatment of negligence,
the Restatement specifies that tort does not adopt as its "reasonableness" stand-
ard any statute or regulation that is strictly meant to serve the state, its subdivi-
sions, or individuals in their capacity as "members of the public."290 It explains
that many state laws are designed to protect "the community as such," and
therefore "create an obligation only to the state, or to some subdivision of the
state."29 1 It further explains that some statutes are meant to protect individuals
in their role as members of the public, rather than in their role as private indi-
viduals. When the violation of such a statute interferes with the rights of all in-
dividuals as members of the public, it cannot be the basis of a tort claim. If,
however, one suffers a harm "distinct from that suffered by the rest of the
community," he may be entitled to a tort remedy.292 Equating a "community"
protected by legislation with "the state or any subdivision of it," and stressing
that this community does not automatically hold a tort right to private com-
pensation for injury, 293 indicates that the "community" under discussion in this
section, unlike the one referenced in others, is the political community.
In just two other sections, the Restatement specifically refers to "communi-
ty" as a unit of political organization. In the public nuisance section, the Re-
statement explains that the tort originated as a common-law crime responding
to interference with "the interests of the community at large," or with the "gen-
eral public."294 It then explains that as a rule, private individuals cannot recover
in tort for actions on the land that invade "purely public" rights because
"[r] edress of the wrong to the entire community is left to its duly appointed repre-
sentatives."29 These two sections make clear that communities "at large" or "en-
tire" communities are purely political organizations where rights and remedies
are governed by positive law adopted through a public choice mechanism. That
the balance of the Restatement's forty-three references to "community" do not
refer to the community "as such," "at large," or "in its entirety," or to states,
state subdivisions, or "the general public," indicates that most references to
289. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (emphasis added).
Where the Restatement discusses "public necessity" as the basis for a privilege to enter land
without incurring liability for invading the right of the property holder, it observes that
many states have passed legislation addressing response to fires. Id. cmts. g, h.
29o. Id. § 288.
291. Id. cmt. b (emphasis added).
292. Id. cmt. c.
293. Id. § 288.
294. Id. § 821B cmt. b (emphasis added).
295. Id. § 821C cmt. a (emphasis added).
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community are not to the political community, but to community at a subpolit-
ical or apolitical level- to sociological community.2 9 6
2. Sociological Community. Tort doctrine seems to prioritize "community" as
the source of liability norms in part because communities can take a variety of
shapes and thus allow adaptation of liability standards to a variety of circum-
stances. The Restatement makes this point explicit in its explanation of the "rea-
sonable man" standard crucial to negligence liability (and also relevant in in-
tentional and strict torts). It says that negligence is a "departure from a
standard of conduct demanded by the community for the protection of others
against unreasonable risk."297 Using "community" as the source of the standard
provides sufficient flexibility, and leeway, to permit due allowance to be
made for such differences between individuals as the law permits to be
taken into account, and for all of the particular circumstances of the
case which may reasonably affect the conduct required, and at the same
time affords a formula by which, so far as possible, a uniform standard
may be maintained.2 98
Applying this sophisticated understanding of "community," tort doctrine
deftly invokes different dimensions of community as the sources of norms for
different causes of action or liability elements. In doing so, it acknowledges that
community can be organized along a spectrum: some communities comprise
likeminded, geographically compact social groups, while others comprise di-
verse, geographically decentralized social groups; some comprise members of a
specific profession or trade, while others comprise lay individuals. When the
Restatement considers a distinct type of community an authoritative source of
liability norms for a specific cause of action or liability element, it explicitly
identifies that precise community.
a. Closed communities. For example, in a number of negligence doctrines,
the Restatement points to closed, local communities as the source of information
about "reasonableness." In defining a "licensee" to whom a landowner owes a
296. The Restatement underlines this interpretation at one point: the general rule regarding tres-
pass by livestock is one of strict liability against the livestock owner, but the drafters explain
that in some states the rule has been adapted in response to conditions "within [the state] or
some part of it," where because of local geography or economic development "the interest of
the community" necessitates that livestock "be permitted to 'graze at large."' Id. § 504 cmt. k
(emphasis added). This commentary specifically acknowledges that the "community" rele-
vant to tort liability is not coterminous with the "state" as a whole, but instead is a product
of apolitical mechanisms like geography and lifestyle priorities.
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duty of care, the Restatement explains that one may have "consent" to enter land
even in the absence of verbal agreement if community custom favors free entry
under the circumstance.2 99 The Restatement specifically points to the custom of
"local" community,00 noting that if in a particular town the custom is to let
people freely cut across vacant lots, the property owner has impliedly assented
to such access. The Restatement requires professionals and tradespersons to use
the skill and knowledge of their peers "in similar communities.""o' The Re-
statement explains that the standards of professional and trade communities
may fluctuate with the realities imposed by different geographic locales: "[a]
country doctor cannot be expected to have the equipment, facilities, experience,
knowledge or opportunity to obtain it, afforded him by a large city."302
So, too, in strict liability. Liability for abnormally dangerous activities turns
in part on the value of the activity to the "community," with community con-
ceptualized as geographically local. The Restatement explains that a dangerous
activity may become "abnormal" if it is inappropriate for the locality where it is
undertaken.os
Definition of the "community" as a geographically local entity is found
within intentional torts as well. For example, consideration of the "gravity of
the harm" in private nuisance. depends in part on how suitable the contested
activity is to "the character of the locality." 30 4 Utility of nuisance activity, too, is
a function of the suitability of the activity to the locality. 30 s In fact, the com-
ments to the section specifically state that liability turns on "the community
standards of relative social value prevailing at the time and place," suggesting
that those standards are built to fluctuate depending on the composition of the
nuisance-hosting community.30
299. Id. § 330 cmt. e; see also id. § 892 (discussing consent generally).
300. Id. cmts. e, f, h.
301. Id. § 29 9A.
302. Id. cmt. g.
303. Id. § 520; see also id. § 509 cmts. d, e (explaining that an animal is "abnormally" dangerous
when it is one unusual in the community, and giving a bull as an example of a normally dan-
gerous animal, which members of a farming community know to be dangerous and is there-
fore usual); id. § 930 cnit. b (explaining that a recovery of future damages may be preferable
to an injunction where an otherwise liable harm may be "economically beneficial to the
community" and should not be shut down, suggesting a plant or factory crucial to a geo-
graphic community).
304. Id. § 827.
30S. Id. § 828.
306. Id. cmt. b (emphasis added).
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b. The open community. On the other hand, the Restatement occasionally rec-
ognizes that "community" may be organized on a far broader, less personal
scale. Discussing the standard of conduct for negligence, the Restatement states
that "recognizing [the] existence of risk" is a key consideration.1 7 It goes on to
distinguish between what is expected of "the average man in the community"
and what is expected of a man confronted with atypical circumstances that re-
quire more care than the average man would owe.308 It then gives as an exam-
ple of the "average man in the community" a "traveler[] upon the highway" -
someone who would seem to belong to a community that spans multiple locali-
ties. " His atypical counterpart is a driver crossing a railroad track with limited
visibility, an act that generally arises during local driving.310
Similarly, when discussing the "utility" of an actor's conduct for purposes
of determining the standard of care, the Restatement alludes to a broad, diverse,
national community as the source of liability standards.3 1 ' Utility, for tort pur-
poses, is found where a private endeavor provides benefit to those not directly
involved in it. The drafters offer as an example manufacturing, where some risk
is tolerated not because manufacturing benefits those directly involved in it,
but because it benefits "the whole community," presumably including consum-
ers of goods and those who profit indirectly from manufacturing by producing
parts, selling at the retail level, or marketing mass-produced goods. 312 The Re-
statement's discussion of product liability can be understood as referring to this
same national community.1 Product liability is found where a chattel for sale
307. Id. § 289.
308. Id. cmt. i.
309. Id.
310. Id. The commentary is an obvious reference to the debate between Justices Holmes and
Cardozo over the wisdom of imposing a uniform "stop, look, and listen" rule of conduct to
all drivers crossing railroad tracks. Compare Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66
(1927), with Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934). Notably, this debate crystallized
their split on how to incentivize efficient allocation of resources, which they both identified
as the purpose of tort law. (Holmes wished to relieve railroads of remote liability in order to
allow them to transport goods and people, while Cardozo resisted the notion that railroads
were per se free of any duty of care in traveling through populated areas.) The Restatement
position-that there can be more than one standard of care depending on the circum-
stance -is a direct outgrowth of the doctrinal emphasis on community and the implication
that it may be either national and impersonal or local and personal in different injury set-
tings.
311. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 292 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
312. Id. cmt. a.
313. Id. § 402A.
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is "unreasonably dangerous."3 14 Unreasonable danger is defined as danger "to
an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer
who purchases [the item], with the ordinary knowledge common to the com-
munity as to its characteristics.""'s The community of "consumers" of mass-
produced goods is necessarily a community that exists outside specific geo-
graphic boundaries - it is likely to be national or at least regional in nature.
c. The toggle between closed and open. The Restatement suggests in its negli-
gence discussion that tort doctrine encourages decision makers to toggle be-
tween different communities when assessing the duties that private people owe
to one another. First, in outlining the plaintiff's burden of proof for a negli-
gence cause of action, the Restatement provides that the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant owed him a duty to act reasonably. 6 The Restatement fur-
ther provides that "[t]his standard of conduct may vary" in accordance with
circumstances and community customs. 1 Echoing this message is the Re-
statement's provision that individuals who interact with other private people are
expected to know the qualities and habits of humans, animals, things, and
forces "in so far as they are matters of common knowledge at the time and in
the community.""
The drafters then observe that "a man living in the northern part of Minne-
sota is required to expect extremely cold temperature in early winter," whereas
one "in the tropics is required to expect hot weather, even in winter."" Fur-
ther, the drafters give examples of common local knowledge and common na-
tional knowledge as the sources of different liability standards. The drafters
explain that where a driver is operating a car, one of whose tires "is worn down
to the fabric," the danger is "a matter of common knowledge in the communi-
ty, and he is negligent.320 Clearly, the "community" referenced is the open
community of drivers, all of whose cars have the same mass-produced tires.
The drafters then explain that where a driver is speeding on an icy road and the
propensity of cars to skid at high speed is common knowledge in the commu-
nity, the driver who speeds and skids is negligent even if he was unaware of the
risks of skidding.321 The "community" referenced here is a local community
314. Id. cmt. i.
315. Id.
316. Id. § 328A.
317. Id. cmt. c.
318. Id. § 290(a); see also supra notes 285-288 and accompanying text.
319. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 292 cmt. c (AM. LAw INST. 1965).
320. Id. illus. 2.
321. Id. illus. 4.
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familiar with ice. This statement could be understood to imply the inverse as
well: a driver in a local community unfamiliar with ice would not be liable for
failing to use tactics his cold-weather counterpart would know. For example, if
a Nashville driver lost control of his car while driving in a freak snowstorm, the
Restatement does not suggest that he would be expected to know how to steer
into the skid, and consequently his failure to do so would likely not be negli-
gent. However, if the same driver moved to Albany the next year and failed to
steer into the skid during the season's first snowstorm, the Restatement indi-
cates that the failure would be negligent because part of belonging to that
community is knowing how to cope with snowy roads.
C. The Prescriptive Implications of Community in Tort Doctrine
As a descriptive matter, it is clear that tort doctrine points to "community"
as the source of interpersonal liability norms. The Restatement repeatedly di-
rects that open-textured liability elements in the nominate, negligent, and
strict-liability torts operate as portals through which decision makers are to
import the external social norms of the community. Further, the Restatement
acknowledges the reality that in the United States, sociological community may
develop in both closed and open configurations. Case law confirms that Ameri-
can courts have from the colonial period considered doctrinal elements in the
nominate, negligence, and strict-liability torts to be vehicles for the importa-
tion of community behavioral norms. In the early period, courts looked with-
out question to the cohesive norms of the closed community within which in-
juries were most likely to be inflicted. In the early twentieth century, two
landmark tort cases adapted doctrine in a way that allowed for the bringing of
tort suits within the open community. Thereafter, courts continued to use
community as the source of interpersonal liability norms but toggled between
the closed and open community in their search for the relevant norms in par-
ticular cases. In other words, courts have for decades moved fluidly between
assigning liability in a way that instantiates morality and doing so in a way that
achieves efficiency.
Notably, modern courts have been shifting between applying closed and
open norms on an ad hoc basis from case to case with little analysis of how and
why they are selecting between the two for purposes of particular cases. In oth-
er words, the unacknowledged duality of the "community" concept has ob-
scured the fact that tort has been operating simultaneously as a law of morality
and as a law of efficiency throughout the entire modern period. Scholars who
have become mired in the morality-versus-efficiency debate have missed the
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opportunity to theorize tort at a higher level of generality.322 If tort law is rec-
ognized as the law of community norms, it is neither necessary nor desirable to
pick between morality and efficiency. In fact, the descriptive account of tort as
the law of community forces a prescriptive imperative: tort should embrace its
capacity to toggle between morality and efficiency."2 Specifically, tort doctrine
and procedure should guide courts in selecting the community whose norms
are relevant to the assignment of liability in any given case.
IV. TORT LAW'S COMMUNITY TOGGLE IN OPERATION
Modern courts have been intuitively toggling between the morality norms
of closed communities and the efficiency norms of the open community. Ac-
knowledging tort law's capacity to toggle and developing doctrine to guide the
toggling process would lead to a more predictable body of tort law that sends
cleaner sociological signals and that takes a sturdier place in relation to other
bodies of law. This Part illustrates how an explicit tort toggle would operate
given that intentional, negligent, and strict-liability injuries arise in both local
and national communities. When an injury is inflicted within a closed commu-
nity, that community would supply the sociological norms sought by the open-
textured element of the relevant tort. This could dictate different-but equally
legitimate- outcomes for torts brought within different communities, even if
those communities exist within the same state. Further, when an injury is in-
322. Some theorists have acknowledged that tort serves multiple purposes, but they have not
identified a single unified theory that accounts for these dual purposes. See, e.g., Christopher
J. Robinette, Torts Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin, 14 GEo. MASON L. REV. 329
(2007); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Correc-
tive Justice, 75 TEX. L. REv. 18oi (1997). That Schwartz was the first Reporter for the Re-
statement (Third) of Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm may explain the fairly even di-
vision among theoretical references within that document. See supra note 102.
323. Admittedly, to prescribe a change in tort that reflects observations about human psychology
may look like yet another "external" theory of tort. To be clear, the Article does not urge a
toggle model of tort liability for the purpose of conforming tort to the realities of human
psychology. Quite the opposite. It is because individuals intuitively adapt their normative
preferences to their social contexts that tort doctrine has embedded devices that invite con-
text-sensitive assignments of liability. Judges have for years been using those devices to ren-
der both justice-driven verdicts and efficiency-driven verdicts as circumstances have re-
quired, and drafters of the Restatement have captured this practice. In short, the toggle is
already present within tort doctrine. What has been absent is a frank acknowledgment that
decision makers deploy the toggle. Acknowledging the ability to toggle and the reality that
toggling is already underway both honors the existing structure of the law and simultane-
ously reveals that the availability of multiple norms is essential to the achievement of its uni-
tary, community-constructing purpose.
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flicted within the open community, that community would supply the socio-
logical norm sought by the open-textured element of the relevant tort. It is
possible that the modern community shares some moral values, but it is far
more likely that the members of the modern community hold a plurality of
values. In that typical case, an efficiency norm would be imported to the liabil-
ity assessment. The same pattern would apply in all three headings of liability.
A. Intentional Torts
Battery is, on its face, an uncomplicated intentional tort. The defendant is
liable for any unconsented touching of the plaintiff that is harmful or offen-
sive. 324 However, "offensive" touchings are those deemed to "offend[] a reason-
able sense of personal dignity" in light of the "social usages prevalent at the
time and place at which it is inflicted."32 5 It is no surprise, therefore, that the
question of "offense" may not be subject to a unitary answer when the same
behavior takes place within different communities. When plaintiffs have
brought battery claims premised on their inhalation of smoke emitted by de-
fendants, it is to be expected that different results would follow.
For example, a North Carolina postal employee allergic to smoke sued his
supervisor for smoking a cigar during meetings in a confined office despite the
supervisor's awareness of the plaintiff's condition.3 26 Tobacco has "traditionally
been one of the most important industries in North Carolina and a backbone of
the state's agricultural heritage."327 A North Carolina appellate court found that
absent evidence of actual sickness resulting from the smoke, the plaintiff's dis-
tress from inhaling the smoke was insufficient to find the smoker liable for bat-
tery.3 2 8 It was to be expected that the court would hesitate to empower com-
munity members to recover for battery simply by expressing an aversion to
tobacco. Similar facts led to a different result in Ohio, where there is virtually
no tobacco farming industry.329 There, the court found that a radio host who
intentionally blew cigar smoke into the face of an antismoking activist who ap-
324. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 18-20 (AM. LAWINST. 1965).
325. Id. § 19 cmt. a.
326. McCracken v. Sloan, 252 S.E.2d 250, 251-52 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
327. Duke Ctr. on Globalization, Governance, & Competitiveness, North Carolina in the
Global Economy: Tobacco, N.C. GLOBAL ECON., http://www.ncglobaleconomy.com/tobacco
/overview.shtml [http://perma.cc/YW8G-BW9B].
328. McCracken, 252 S.E.2d at 252.
329. The Shrinking Role of Tobacco Farming and Tobacco Product Manufacturing in Ohio's Economy,
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peared on his show could be held liable for battery.30 In both cases, courts
drew from closed community norms to decide whether the private decision to
expose an unwilling person to smoke would be understood as an affront to the
non-smoker's dignity, with predictably different results given the traditional
communities within which the alleged batteries took place.
When similar claims are made within the open community, typically
framed as battery and assault lawsuits against tobacco companies by individu-
als complaining about the health effects of second-hand smoke, courts, without
a unitary national norm against smoking and without reliable evidence that a
liability rule would efficiently deter smoking injuries,"33 have rejected them as
untenable.33 2
B. Strict-Liability Torts
The same dynamic is relevant to strict-liability litigation. Defendants are
strictly liable for injuries caused by "abnormally dangerous activity.""3 "Ab-
normal" danger turns on the high degree of risk of harm, the gravity of that
harm, the "inability to eliminate that risk," the uncommonness of the activity,
the poor fit between the activity and the place it occurs, and whether the activi-
ty's "value to the community" is outweighed by its danger.334 The last three of
these factors tie the "abnormality" of an activity to its role in community life.
Of course, different activities play vastly different roles in different communi-
ties. Thus, strict liability should require the decision maker to identify the pre-
cise community whose norms are relevant to the determination of "abnormali-
ty."
330. Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Commc'ns, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 697, 698, 700 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)
(per curiam).
331. See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post
Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1175-76, 1260-62 (1998).
332. E.g., Shaw v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 973 F. Supp. 539, 548 (D. Md. 1997) (re-
jecting a battery claim based on exposure to second-hand smoke, and stating that "[i]t is
unsurprising that neither plaintiffs nor the Court have been able to unearth any case where a
manufacturer of cigarettes or handguns was found to have committed a battery against
those allegedly injured by its products"); Tijerina v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. CIV.A. 2:95-
CV-120-J, 1996 WL 885617, at *4-6 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 1996) (finding that battery claims
based on injury from fibers and chemicals inhaled during smoking were "novel," and deny-
ing class certification to plaintiffs).
333. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
334. See id. §§ 5 20(a)-(f).
1387
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
For example, the mother of a twenty-six-year-old man who took his life
after suffering multiple concussions while playing youth and high school foot-
ball recently sued a youth football organization for her son's wrongful death
and her own loss of his companionship."' She alleged that the football league
should be strictly liable because youth football is "abnormally dangerous." 33 6 As
"abnormality" results in part from community values, the cultural resonance of
amateur football within the relevant community must be assessed -and that is
likely to vary from community to community.
In West Texas, high school football plays a crucial role in the social infra-
structure. 3 In contrast, school officials in Missouri and Maine have recently
shut down their football programs because students have so little interest in the
game that officials fear they cannot safely field a team. 3  Explicit application of
the tort toggle would dictate a finding of liability-of abnormality-where both
plaintiff and defendant are members of a Maine community that does not as-
sign social importance to football, but a finding of no liability-of normality-
where both plaintiff and defendant are members of a West Texas community
that assigns great social importance to football. The mere fact that the liability
outcomes are different would not necessarily render either of them incorrect.
They would each be correct because they would each reflect the endogenous,
intersubjective preferences of their respective communities, and would not in-
fringe on the contrary intersubjective preferences of other closed communities.
However, Pyka's suit involved a plaintiff from rural Wisconsin and a na-
tional corporate defendant, Pop Warner Football. In this circumstance, the
335. Complaint, Pyka v. Pop Warner Little Scholars, Inc., No. 15-CV- 57 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 5, 2015).
336. Id. at 20-21.
337. See Len Hayward, Football Defines West Texas Towns, ESPN (Oct. 14, 2oo8), http://
www.espn.com/highschool/rise/football/news/story?id=3642102 [http://perma.cc/6RN3
-QPWW] ("The area's general isolation is a major reason. Excluding the sprawling and
growing metropolis of El Paso, there is no city in West Texas with more than 300,000 peo-
ple. Dotted across a landscape larger than many states in the Northeast are a number of
small towns and cities that in many cases are 5o miles apart-and sometimes loo or more
miles apart. And the centerpiece of the towns is the school, because many of the town's [sic]
economies are based on the boom and bust nature of oil, farming and ranching. The school
is sometimes a city's or county's largest employer, and it is the gathering place for nearly eve-
ryone in those communities. Even in the larger cities, the happenings at the local school dis-
trict will dominate news, and that has bled over to the football team through the years. 'Oil
may go up and down and cotton may go up and down, but the schools and football will al-
ways be there,' said Abilene High coach Steve Warren. 'More than anything else, it gives the
community something to rally around."').
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plaintiff and defendant did not belong to a single closed community, and
therefore the decision maker could not determine liability based on shared in-
tersubjective values. Instead, the decision maker would have to toggle to an
efficiency approach, asking whether the benefit of Pop Warner and youth foot-
ball nationally outweighed its capacity to harm. This could well require an ex-
amination of the economic benefits of the activity and the cost associated with
the injuries, perhaps through introduction of expert testimony.
C. Negligence
The toggle works equally well in the negligence setting where norms may
fluctuate between communities. The 2015 measles outbreak in California is a
case in point. At the time, California had a positive law requiring parents to fol-
low a standard immunization schedule before enrolling their children in
school, but it had carved out a liberal exception to the requirement for parents
who claim a "personal belief" that prevents immunizing.3 In 2013, fewer than
three percent of incoming California kindergartners declined vaccination for
reasons of "personal belief."3" 0 However, in Northern California's Mill Valley
almost nine percent of kindergartners were unimmunized; and in the suburb's
Greenwood School, about two-thirds of incoming kindergartners had not been
immunized."' In other words, the political community of the state left a gap
between preferring vaccinations and mandating them in its legislation. Within
that gap, different communities generated different social norms.342
339. Jim Welte, Mill Valley Parents Reject Vaccines at a Higher Rate than State and Marin County





342. Notably, when that gap left state children vulnerable to measles, the California legislature
could not act fast enough to thwart the spread of the disease. Instead, the sociological com-
munity took immediate steps to both educate and stigmatize anti-vaccination parents. Erin
Allday & Victoria Colliver, Vaccine Efforts Focus on Shot-Shy Parents, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 1,
2015, 9:30 PM), http://www.sfchronicle.com/health/article/Vaccine-efforts-focus-on-shot
-shy-parents-6o55677.php [http://perma.cc/T6JP-6CCC] ("[I]n California, about 92 per-
cent of children are fully vaccinated by kindergarten, although those rates vary widely from
county to county."). Many parents publicly complained that unvaccinated children in their
local schools were endangering public health. Local news outlets published lists of local
schools with the highest populations of unvaccinated children, essentially shaming parents
toward a more vaccine-friendly norm without relying on the political community to change
the current regulatory scheme. See, e.g., Lauren M. Whaley, Measles Outbreak: Bay Area
Day Cares Show High Rates of Unvaccinated Kids, MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 6, 2015, 8:47
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A parent whose child contracted measles from a Greenwood School student
might sue that student's family for negligence. 34 The reasonableness of declin-
ing to vaccinate could be contingent on the norms of the community within
which the interpersonal dispute arose. Thus, if both the infector and infectee
attended the Greenwood School, the school community's norm -against vac-
cination -would dictate a finding of no negligence. Conversely, if the infector
attended anti-vaccine Greenwood and the infectee attended a pro-vaccine pub-
lic school outside of Mill Valley, there would be no common cultural norm and
the decision maker would toggle to an efficient outcome. The benefit of pro-
tecting personal belief would be weighed against the risk of infecting the herd,
and liability would likely be imposed.344
D. Implementing the Toggle
Toggling in this explicit fashion is admittedly a novel exercise for which
there is no established model. A comprehensive treatment of the procedural
and substantive innovations needed to fully implement a tort toggle are beyond
the scope of this Article. However, a few points bear mention. First, empirical
evidence suggests that juries are typically instructed to trust and apply their
own intuitions about what care the community expects in a given circum-
stance, 4 s but that juries find these instructions confusing because they conflict
with admonitions to restrict jurors' deliberations to evidence introduced in
AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/health/ci_27659828/measles-outbreak-bay-area-day
-cares-show-high [http://perma.cc/5HDS-WEHK]. Had a negligence lawsuit been brought
by parents outside the anti-vaccination Mill Valley community against Mill Valley parents
who had declined to vaccinate, it would have presented an opportunity to discern and an-
nounce a pro-vaccination norm among the wider community, reinforcing the sociological
norms symbolized by these informal efforts. It took the political community six months to
mobilize lawmakers to eliminate the personal belief exemption.
343. See, e.g., Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Compensating the Victims of Failure To Vaccinate: What Are
the Options?, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 595, 597-98 (2014).
344. Notably, in any of these situations, if a majority of the political community agreed that the
contested behavior posed the kind of threat to health, safety, or welfare that warranted a
state-sponsored prohibition, they could urge representatives to redistrict the behavior from
private law treatment to public law treatment and promulgate positive law accordingly. For
example, the political community in California eventually mobilized to eliminate the per-
sonal belief exemption from mandatory vaccinations. See Phil Willon & Melanie Mason,
California Gov. Jerry Brown Signs New Vaccination Law, One of Nation's Toughest, L.A. TIMEs
(June 30, 2015, 9:11 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-In-governor-signs
-tough-new-vaccination-law-2o5o 63o-story.html [http://perma.cc/3Q69-M3FM].
345. See, e.g., Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What judges Tell Juries About Negligence: A Re-
view of PatternJury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587, 620-21 (2002).
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court.34 6 In order for the toggle to work most effectively, particularly in the jury
setting, juries would have to be explicitly instructed that their personal experi-
ence of community care expectations is a relevant and permissible basis for giv-
ing meaning to open-textured liability elements such as "reasonable," "outra-
geous," "defamatory," and "ultrahazardous."
Second, where a community has a strong identity and readily discernable
norms, the process of importing those norms into the liability decision would
pose few problems. So, for example, if a plaintiff who crossed a union picket
line sued for defamation after having been called a "scab" publicly, it is fairly
self-evident that jurors in the union-rich Detroit community might find the
word likely to lower the plaintiffs estimation in the community, while jurors in
a state without deep union activity might find the word unlikely to do so.
Community norms would yield a "defamatory" finding in the former instance
and a "not defamatory" finding in the latter. But the toggle is admittedly harder
to operationalize when communities or community norms are less definite. Not
only would the scope of the community have to be determined, either through
a judicial finding or through the introduction of evidence and a jury finding,
but the jury would also have to articulate its understanding of a norm that
might be inchoate. Importantly, the role of the jury in community construction
is arguably even more important in these difficult cases. The act of expressing
this norm publicly begins the process of construction, as it opens an opportuni-
ty for community response through public discussion and possibly a contrary
decision in a subsequent related case.
Notably, juries already seem to intuit that one dimension of their role is to
communicate expectations about the care that community members owe to one
another and to the public at large. Oftentimes during deliberations, jurors dis-
cuss the fact that their liability determinations "send a message" or a "wakeup
call" to those situated similarly to the plaintiff or the defendant."'4 At the same
time, individual jury verdicts are inherently constrained in their reach by virtue
of their decentralized and fact-specific nature.34 8 This structural constraint
346. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, Beth Murphy & Mary R. Rose, The "Kettlefull of Law" in
Real Jury Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, io6 Nw. U. L. REV. 1537, 1573-74
(2012). Diamond and her coauthors studied actual jury deliberations in Arizona cases, find-
ing that in automobile accident cases, for example, "[s]ome jurors who conscientiously fo-
cused on the admonition to decide only on the evidence were unsure whether or not their
personal experiences as drivers or accident victims could be discussed during deliberations."
Id. at 1574.
347. Id. at 1582-83.
348. The same cannot be said of appellate court opinions addressing the legitimacy of the jury
verdict or the processes that produced it. Many appellate court holdings read like generally
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minimizes the impact of any one verdict later determined to be a poor repre-
sentation of preferences within either the sociological or the political communi-
ties. Further, the public nature of jury verdicts means that even "erroneous"
verdicts serve the purpose of alerting communities to the existence of a senti-
ment that may require override. So jury verdicts identified by community
members as dissonant with prevailing norms may ultimately be contradicted
by subsequent verdicts.
Similarly, the availability of tort as a method for publicly articulating socio-
logical community norms can alert the political community to groups whose
private norms require a forceful public response. How so? Some jury verdicts
may accurately represent a sociological community norm, and be doctrinally
correct as a reflection of that community's intersubjective values. Nevertheless,
they might offend the preferences of the political community. This type of ver-
dict operates as a red flag, alerting the political community that it needs to act
collectively to dismantle a particular sociological community preference by
promulgating contrary positive law. Tort law's unique and primary competence
is in nurturing mechanisms for private coordination that relieve the political
community of lawmaking and peacekeeping obligations. But when private co-
ordination trespasses on the political community's shared desire for safety or
health in some discernable fashion, positive lawmaking is necessary and benefi-
cial. Aberrant tort verdicts provide information about these sociological com-
munity trespasses.
For example, as the existence of sociological preferences against vaccination
in outlier communities has drawn more public attention, the political commu-
nity preference in favor of mandatory vaccination has grown more robust.
When California learned about pockets of community resistance to vaccines
during its 2015 measles outbreak, the political community mobilized to limit its
statutory "personal belief exception" to vaccine requirements.3 49 But several
months elapsed between the outbreak and the eventual political response. Had
an anti-vaccination family been sued and exonerated by an insular anti-
applicable rules that would hold across multiple times and circumstances. This is one reason
that the shift in tort law's center of decision-making gravity from the jury to the judge is a
dubious development, at least within a community-constructing account of tort. See, e.g.,
Smith, supra note 169, at 445 (tracing the latitude enjoyed by the jury in the antebellum pe-
riod and its erosion as the country industrialized). Further, whether judicial rulemaking
within tort law is desirable has been the subject of longstanding debate. See, e.g., supra note
310 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Holmes's effort to establish a uniform "stop,
look, and listen" obligation on all drivers crossing railroad tracks and the eventual success of
Justice Cardozo in dismantling that rule in favor of a more open-textured, context-sensitive
approach).
349. See Willon & Mason, supra note 344.
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vaccination community prior to the massive outbreak, news of the verdict
would have publicized the existence of this aberrant community and the politi-
cal process might have been activated sooner.
Although implementing a community toggle is not without concrete chal-
lenges,3 5 0 it is nevertheless promising for several reasons. First, it would im-
prove the internal coherence of tort by emphasizing tort law's function of ana-
lyzing whether contested behavior is welcome or unwelcome in particular
communities that depend on private coordination of interpersonal relation-
ships. Further, it would clarify the appropriate use of insights from non-legal
disciplines. For example, it would allow economic analysis to be leveraged to-
wards determining the optimal conduct of youth football nationally, but would
discourage such efficiency metrics to resolve a defamation case between two au-
toworkers who clash at the union hiring hall during a labor strike. Finally, us-
ing the toggle to clarify the community reach of particular verdicts could also
clarify the role of tort in relation to other bodies of law. This possibility is dis-
cussed below.
V. COMMUNITY AS A MEANS FOR MEASURING TORT LAW'S
OVERLAP WITH OTHER BODIES OF LAW
Aside from improving the internal coherence of tort law, the toggling ap-
proach has important practical implications when tort interacts with other bod-
ies of law. These interactions tend to arise when the deeply held values of local
.communities are at odds with those of the national political community, typi-
cally on controversial topics such as the regulation of cyber harassment or gun
ownership. As long as the purpose of tort remains ambiguous, the process of
resolving conflicts between tort and public law is vulnerable to outcome-driven
analysis. But placing tort on a firmer footing can improve the consideration of
these conflicts. For example, when a constitutional principle appears incon-
sistent with a tort verdict, or when federal regulation is in tension with a tort
verdict, clarifying the underlying purpose served by the verdict at issue may
dictate whether it must give way to the contrary federal value. Put simply, the
extent of overlap between a tort adjudication and positive public law generated
350. Operationalizing the tort toggle might require procedural refinements in tort cases. For ex-
ample, litigants might have to specify in their pleadings the scope of the community relevant
to the injury at issue, and might have to introduce evidence as to the norms of that commu-
nity. Further, if cases were decided by a jury, the court might have to instruct jurors as to the
scope of the relevant community as a matter of law, or instruct jurors to delineate the scope
of the community themselves as a matter of fact.
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at the federal level may vary depending on the community reach of a particular
verdict.
In fact, the friction between state private law and federal public law may be
conceptualized as no more than a standard choice of law question. The dilem-
ma posed when two bodies of law are competing to govern a given set of facts
can be reduced to a pair of questions."s' First, what is the scope, or reach, of
each contending law? If the two contending regimes' scopes do not in fact
overlap, there is no conflict to resolve. If the two regimes' scopes do overlap,
however, then the court selecting between them must ask a second question:
which takes priority?3 52 In the case of conflicts between state private law and
the Constitution or between state private law and federal statutes or regula-
tions, the answer to the "priority" question is predetermined by the Supremacy
Clause. But the priority question may never require an answer if a nuanced ap-
proach is taken in answering the "scope" question. If state private law is, in a
particular case or circumstance, constructing only a traditional closed commu-
nity, its scope may not intrude at all upon federal regimes. If so, there is no
need to choose between the two, and they may operate concurrently without
raising Supremacy Clause concerns. Conversely, if state private law is, in a par-
ticular case or circumstance, designed to construct norms for the modern, open
community, its scope may overlap considerably with federal regimes. In those
cases, the court must assign priority to one of the candidates and the Suprema-
cy Clause mandates that the federal regime take priority.
A. Tort Versus the Constitution
Although the dynamic has been underexamined, select constitutional pro-
visions seem to pose at least a theoretical conflict with the operation of tort.
Among these are the guaranteed freedoms of the First and Second Amend-
ments, along with some dimensions of the guaranteed due process of law.
i. Dignitary Torts and Freedom of Speech
The most obvious, and most well-developed, example of this conflict arises
in the context of dignitary torts. In 1964, the Supreme Court announced for the
first time that the defamation tort was state action subject to the First Amend-
ment as incorporated against the states.ss In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
351. See KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1-2 (2010).
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the Court conceptualized defamation as an ex ante rule which, by invoking the
threat of damages in response to injurious words, amounted to an abridgment
of speech. The Court held Alabama's defamation tort unconstitutional3 s- and in
a series of cases over the next two decades crafted a defamation scheme of its
own,3 Ss designed to protect democratically relevant speech while permitting
private figures to recover when injured. This scheme has also been held to ap-
ply to the torts of false light invasion of privacy.s. and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.357
In rendering these opinions, the Court seemed to conceptualize these nom-
inate torts as ex ante regulatory rules that had the potential to externalize local
speech norms onto the pluralistic 'national community. For example, in Sulli-
van, Justice Black observed that the Alabama jury verdict in favor of a local
sheriff, who complained that a New York Times advertisement accused him of
brutality during civil rights protests, was sending a message to "outside agita-
tors" in the Northern media.5 ' The Court seemed alarmed that a closed local
community could set speech norms for the open national community, and held
that the First Amendment superseded tort rules to prevent that result.s9 But in
a later case, the Court overrode a local jury's finding that a suburban newspa-
per's reference to a community businessman as a "blackmailer" would be un-
derstood as a charge of criminal behavior.360 In doing so, the Court again
354. Id. at 283-84.
355. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Supreme Court's Stealth Return to the
Common Law of Torts, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 439-40 (2016) (tracing cases over a two-
decade period that reconceived defamation liability by distinguishing between public and
private plaintiffs; requiring each category to prove a different level of defendant scienter; and
shifting the burden of proof on falsehood from the defendant to the plaintiff (among other
changes)).
356. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
357. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
Because some courts have expanded the category of "public figure" to include those with a
significant social media following, this scheme presents obstacles to dignitary tort suits
seeking remedies for cyber harassment and revenge porn. See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Re-
venge Porn, State Law, and Free Speech, 48 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 57, 99-111 (2014) (summarizing
the First Amendment objections to tort claims for revenge porn).
358. 376 U.S. at 294 (Black, J., concurring).
359. See, e.g., Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort, Speech, and the Dubious Alchemy of State Action, 17 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1117 (2015).
360. See Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (holding that no rea-
sonable reader in Greenbelt, Maryland could have understood a newspaper story as imput-
ing a criminal activity when it circulated exclusively within Greenbelt a report of a speaker's
comments that a Greenbelt real estate developer was "blackmailing" the city-although a ju-
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seemed to conceptualize tort as an ex ante regulatory body of law concerned
with finding norms for the national community even though the verdict at is-
sue would have had no impact outside the Maryland suburb where it was ren-
dered.36 1
Activating the toggle approach to tort might allow the Court to reach a
more nuanced accommodation of both freedom and dignity in speech injury
cases. That is, if the Court were to look closely at the community being con-
structed by a particular tort action, it could ask whether the verdict amounted
to an efficient calculation of speech value on a national basis or to a closed
community effort to indicate that legally permissible speech was socially unap-
pealing. The broad scope and regulatory nature of the former verdict is a more
pronounced threat to speech freedom than the modest scope and remedial na-
ture of the latter, and thus might warrant a more categorical application of the
First Amendment.
2. Negligence and the Right To Keep and Bear Arms
Although the constitutional conflict in the speech tort arena is well-trodden
ground, a second conflict appears to be looming on the horizon now that the
Court has incorporated the Second Amendment against the states.362 Specifi-
cally, if a tort verdict rendered for a plaintiff injured by careless speech is state
action subject to the First Amendment, it is plausible that a tort verdict ren-
dered for a plaintiff injured by careless storage or brandishing of a gun is also
state action subject to the Second Amendment. If so, the Court would have to
determine to what extent Second Amendment rights to keep and bear arms
foreclose tort rights to recover for injuries inflicted by those arms. Here, too, a
toggling approach to tort has something to offer. If tort verdicts against gun
owners are conceptualized as ex ante and regulatory, then they categorically in-
fringe on Second Amendment rights and are arguably foreclosed by constitu-
tional principles. But if they are conceptualized as ex post and remedial, then
they may coexist with Second Amendment rights. So, for instance, a negligence
case brought by parents of a child who accidentally grasps and shoots a gun left
unattended in the home of a neighbor, in a community where gun ownership is
ry composed of local residents had decided that the word was capable of just that construc-
tion).
361. Id.
362. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
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widespread, would be an instance of closed community construction.363 In such
a case, whether the particular method of gun storage in the case was "reasona-
ble" would be informed by community gun storage customs. In fact, the ver-
dict in the case would reinforce community solidarity by making explicit the
group's understandings about how guns are to be stored and maintained. But
its identification of deviance for purposes of constructing local community
would not be designed to erect ex ante regulatory norms for those outside the
community.
In contrast, a tort case brought by a nine-year-old tourist against an Arizo-
na shooting range for negligent supervision while she mishandled an Uzi
would be an instance of open community construction.364 Here, the litigants
would not belong to a single closed community with shared values about gun
storage and brandishing. A decision maker attempting to incorporate commu-
nity norms about the reasonableness of the supervision would not have re-
course to a unitary set of social expectations. Instead, she would have to toggle
to a purely efficiency-based inquiry into the general benefit served by the oper-
ation of shooting ranges versus the cost associated with them.
The first case, which incorporates local community norms in deciding
whether one community member owed an interpersonal duty to another, has a
reach limited to the closed community involved in the dispute. Thus, it is less
likely to pose a categorical threat to gun rights enjoyed by the national polity,
and it is not as clear a candidate for invalidation on Second Amendment
grounds. The second case, however, is designed to apply gun supervision
norms across multiple communities and to strike an efficiency norm, because
there is no single community with shared circumstances or values that can
supply the rule of decision. If the decision maker in that case determined that
the shooting range should be liable to the child shooter and her victim because
the national benefit of guns was outweighed by their potential for harm, that
decision is far more likely to have an ex ante regulatory impact than the first
verdict. Thus, it would pose a more categorical threat to Second Amendment
363. See, e.g., Dylan Baddour & Monica Rhor, A Mother's Anguished Cry: "My Baby Is Gone,"
Hous. CHRON. (Mar. 1, 2015, 11:18 PM), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston
-texas/houston/article/A-mother-s-anguished-cry-My-baby-is-gone-6109286.php [http://
perma.cc/6KX4-L2VG]; T. Rees Shapiro & Jim Tankersley, Guns Are Deep in the Culture of
Oregon Town Beset by School Shooting, WASH. PosT (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/business/economy/guns-are-deep-in-the-culture-of-oregon-town-beset-by
-school-shooting/2015/10/o2/cle8O 7 8c-6 9 3 f-nle5-9ef3-fde82507eac story.html [http://
perma.cc/S7L5-DCKG].
364. See, e.g., Dave Hawkins, Shooting Instructor Dies After Being Accidentally Shot by Girl, LAS VE-
GAS REv.-J. (Aug. 26, 2014, 9:24 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/nevada/shoot
ing-instructor-dies-after-being-accidentally-shot-girl [http://perma.cc/2QZT-MNGW].
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rights and would be a more obvious candidate for override by a constitutional
rule prohibiting the imposition of liability.
3. Other Potential Clashes Between Tort and Public Law Rights
The potential for tort liability to pose an arguable overlap with the enjoy-
ment of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms is not limited to the two exam-
ples discussed in detail above. The multiple guarantees found in the First
Amendment arguably complicate the process of tort liability that would appear
to burden the exercise of these rights. For example, tort liability against activ-
ists for injuries that bystanders suffer during public protests could be said to
burden the right to freedom of assembly.365 In all of these instances, under-
standing the sociological preferences that produced the relevant tort verdict
would help courts delineate the scope of the verdict and decide whether effec-
tuating the superior public law guarantee of a right requires a complete over-
ride of the verdict or a more deferential treatment of it.
In addition, the Court has in recent years taken an intense interest in the
due process rights of defendants ordered by juries to pay punitive damages.366
In these cases, community determinations that a defendant has breached socio-
logical norms in a way that requires stigmatization clash with the public law
guarantee of due process of law. The Court has to date hesitated to explicitly
displace state mechanisms for allowing communities to devise stigmatization
measures they deem appropriate, while strongly suggesting that such mecha-
nisms must comply with public law directives found within the Fourteenth
Amendment.367 Acknowledging the community-constructing dimension of the
damages calculation may be helpful in the process of concretizing the kind of
process that is "due" to defendants who are required to participate in this pri-
vate law exercise.
365. See, e.g., Maxwell v. S. Christian Leadership Conference, 414 F.2d 1065, 1067-68 (5th Cir.
1969) (applying the First Amendment to shield an advocacy organization from negligence
liability when a bystander was injured by gunfire that a private individual aimed at protest-
ers as he tried to break from the crowd).
366. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 424-26 (2003) (analyz-
ing the point at which the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages ceases to sat-
isfy due process).
367. See, e.g., id. at 425 (noting that "in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio be-
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B. Preemption
Toggling between community norms could also contribute to a more nu-
anced doctrine of preemption when federal statutes or regulations are in ten-
sion with individual tort verdicts. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution
provides that federal law takes priority over inconsistent state law, and preemp-
tion doctrine operationalizes the prioritization process. State law is considered
expressly preempted "when Congress includes an explicit preemption provi-
sion in a statute."3 68 State law is impliedly preempted when one can infer from
a federal statutory or regulatory scheme that Congress intended the federal law
to deactivate the state law. 3 69 Federal law may impliedly preempt state law ei-
ther when it "so dominates an area such that there is no room left for state law
to operate"3 0 (field preemption), or when state law and federal law are so at
odds that they cannot comfortably coexist. This "conflict preemption" is found
"when an actor could not follow the dictates of state law while complying with
federal law" 7 (impossibility preemption), or when "the state law obstructs or
frustrates the purposes of the federal statutory or regulatory scheme"n3  (obsta-
cle preemption).
In express preemption and implied field preemption, the federal govern-
ment has legislated in a way that categorically disables any role for state law. In
implied conflict preemption, particularly that branch of the doctrine that dis-
places state law because it is thought to pose an insurmountable "obstacle" to
the purposes of federal law, the basis for disabling state law is not a categorical
expression of supremacy by federal legislators but a determination by the court
that the federal law is incompatible with a role for the states. 7 When the state
action alleged to be inconsistent with federal legislation is a statute, the do-
mains of the respective enactments are easy for the court to discern and com-
pare.374 When the state activity alleged to be inconsistent with federal legisla-
tion or regulation is derived from a common-law tort verdict, the court is left to
368. Catherine M. Sharkey, Against Categorical Preemption: Vaccines and the Compensation Piece of





373. Catherine M. Sharkey, Against Freewheeling, Extratextual Obstacle Preemption: Is justice Clar-
ence Thomas the Lone Principled Federalist?, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 63, 84 (2010).
374. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 544-51 (2001) (comparing the provi-
sions of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act with Massachusetts's compre-
hensive regulation of cigarette, smokeless tobacco, and cigar advertising).
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its own devices in delineating the scope of the "tort law" it is attempting to
square with federal law."' Because of the unresolved tension between instru-
mental views of tort as an efficient body of law and as a moral body of law, the
court has some latitude in implied conflict preemption cases to describe tort as
it wishes before examining whether it is incompatible with federal law.
In a series of recent cases, the Court has been inconsistent in characterizing
the purpose and scope of the tort action that is alleged to conflict with federal
law. These cases illustrate that mediating conflicts between federal positive law
and state common law is not just a question of assessing the federal side of the
scale, but also of more fully theorizing the nature of the tort scheme that is al-
leged to pose an obstacle to the realization of federal purposes.
For example, in the 2013 case Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, the
Court was asked to decide whether a tort design defect verdict in favor of a
woman injured by a generic anti-inflammatory drug was preempted by a Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation barring generic drug manufactur-
ers from making changes to either the chemical composition or the label of the
originally patented drug they sell."' The five-Justice majority held that the
FDA regulation preempted the verdict. This holding was, in part, the product
of the majority's conceptualization of the body of law that produced the verdict.
For example, the majority explained that "a tort judgment. . . establishes that
the defendant has violated a state-law obligation," and therefore imposes
"affirmative duties" that are "regulatory" in nature.' The majority explicitly
stated that for preemption purposes, there was no difference between a com-
mon law principle which, when applied to specific facts, exposed a defendant
to ex post financial liability and a statutory "legal mandate" that would draw a
fine or sanction.178
The dissent, in contrast, conceived of tort very differently. First, it acknowl-
edged that tort law can play a deterrence role, but described that role as less
than regulatory: while a maidate leaves a defendant "no choice" about how to
behave, private law liability gives a defendant an incentive to adjust behavior to
avoid ex post liability or elect behavior that could expose him to ex post liabil-
ity.3 79 Further, the dissent noted that the nature of private law tort verdicts, in
375. Sharkey, supra note 368, at 653.
376. 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2013).
377. Id. at 2474 n.1; id. at 2488 (first quoting Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323-24
(2008); then quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 522 (1992); and then quoting
Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 185-86 (1988)).
378. Id. at 2479.
379. Id. at 2488 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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which abstract principles requiring compensation from those who market
products that are "unreasonably" dangerous or that carry "insufficient" warn-
ings are applied to individual fact patterns, complicates the process of identify-
ing "what, if any, specific requirement a state common-law claim imposes.""s
In this respect, a common-law cause of action is different from a regulation or
statute, which specifies behavior that is either required or prohibited (e.g., a
drug label must contain certain language or cannot contain certain language).
The same debate came out the opposite way four years earlier in Wyeth v.
Levine.35 1 In that case, the Supreme Court upheld a Vermont tort verdict for a
woman whose forearm was amputated after an intravenous injection of an anti-
nausea drug despite an FDA decision approving a label that seemed to condone
IV injection. 382 There, the Court indicated that the tort verdict at issue was not
regulatory, in the sense that it did not "mandate a particular replacement warn-
ing, nor did it require [language contraindicating TV-injection of the
drug] . ."383 Instead, the verdict merely indicated that the warning as it ap-
peared was insufficient and that an injury resulting from that insufficiency had
to be compensated. The dissenting Justices, in contrast, described the tort ver-
dict as a device for regulating prescription drug labels.3 84 The verdict, accord-
ing to the dissent, "countermand [ed]" the FDA's drug label.38 5
In sum, the stark contrast in tort conception dictated opposite outcomes for
the two otherwise similar cases of Wyeth and Bartlett, just four years apart.
Moreover, these cases continue a zigzag pattern begun two decades ago, with
the Court veering from a "regulatory-utilitarian" view of tort to a "compensato-
ry-justice" view of tort and varying the preemption outcomes accordingly.3 86
380. Id. at 2489 & n.5.
381. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
382. Id. at 568-70.
383. Id. at 565.
384. Id. at 6o5 (Alito, J., dissenting).
385. Id. Compare Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (holding that FDA's premarket
approval of a medical device, combined with the manufacturer's compliance with the terms
of the approval, barred a common-law claim that challenged the safety and effectiveness of
the medical device), with Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 447 (2005) (remark-
ing that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act's labeling requirements
would preempt only state statutes or common-law rules that would establish labeling man-
dates that diverge from the Act's provisions).
386. See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 610-13, 616-19 (2011) (finding that state tort
law required manufacturers aware of dangers to adopt a label that exceeded FDA require-
ments, but found federal law conflicted with state law and thus preempted the state tort
claim); Bates, 544 U.S. at 445 (explaining that when a tort verdict operated as an incentive to
adopt a safety measure rather than a requirement to do so, preemption was not warranted);
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Rethinking tort as neither per se efficient nor per se justice-driven, but rather
as a device for constructing community that allows room for both efficiency
and justice approaches (depending on the community involved in the case),
may improve on the current approach.
For example, when individuals serving on a state jury in Vermont deter-
mined that the generic anti-inflammatory prescribed for Diana Levine was un-
reasonably dangerous as administered, the first question to ask was whether
the jury was constructing a national, efficient, or a local, moral, community.38 7
If the jury was trying to construct an open national community by determining
the relational obligations of all pharmaceutical companies to all members of the
national community - not with reference to shared values but by optimizing
the value of a drug with side effects - then the tort scope of the case would have
overlapped with the FDA regulation. It would have essentially replaced the
FDA's cost-benefit judgment with an alternate efficient judgment, and posed an
obstacle to the goals of Congress in deputizing the FDA to set safety require-
ments for drugs. But if the jury was trying to construct a local community to
reinforce shared values used to negotiate life in Vermont, then the scope of the
verdict was considerably smaller and posed far less of an obstacle to the FDA's
goal of striking a cost-benefit balance for the entry of a drug onto the national
market.
Admittedly, acknowledging the tort "toggle" would not guarantee uniform
outcomes when tort verdicts are alleged to pose an obstacle to federal regula-
tion. Nonetheless, the use of an explicit toggle in the rendering of a tort verdict
would serve two goals. First, it would provide a more consistent and principled
basis for assessing the scope of the tort verdict at issue and the extent to which
it overlaps with and is therefore preempted by federal law. Second, a mecha-
nism that emphasizes the community-constructing significance of private inju-
ry verdicts makes clear exactly what is being lost when other bodies of law are
aggrandized at the expense of tort.
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 500 (1996) (finding victims' state-law claims of defec-
tive design and negligence not preempted despite federal approval under a substantially
similar law). Catherine M. Sharkey has observed and commented on the same pattern. See
Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 449, 459-66 (20o8).
381. Carrying out this inquiry is not without challenges. One possible approach is to focus on
jury instructions to determine the extent to which the court prescribed a specific rule of deci-
sion that would be broadly applicable to future cases presenting distinct fact patterns, as op-
posed to giving the jury discretion to determine "reasonableness" or "defect" based on the
precise facts before it. In the former case, the verdict rendered would provide future actors a
generalized signal; in the latter case, a specific behavioral rule.
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CONCLUSION
A century ago, Legal Realists disrupted the study of tort law, suggesting
that if it took account of the world outside the courtroom, it could contribute
to revolutionary social changes. But the instrumental approaches designed to
add value to this ancient body of law have actually started diminishing its per-
ceived worth relative to other legal regimes. Tort law's legitimacy is increasingly
seen as contingent on its capacity to realize extralegal goals such as efficiency or
morality. New Doctrinalism promises to reinvigorate tort. Once a set of ab-
stract rules unconnected to the realities of the parties it governed, doctrine is
now being reimagined as a sort of analytical conveyor belt that routes instru-
mental insights to institutions that can deploy them for the unique purposes of
the law. Taking a New Doctrinal approach to tort suggests that efficiency theo-
rists and morality theorists have become so mired in their disciplinary prefer-
ences that they have missed the uniquely legal goal of tort: to construct a socio-
logical community within which individuals can coordinate private
relationships at a negligible cost to the state.
Doctrine clearly indicates that tort law is a body of law about community,
about setting expectations for private interpersonal behavior at a subpolitical
level. It has performed this function since the founding period. However,
American community has evolved considerably since then. While the country
was originally home to a multiplicity of closed communities featuring personal
ties and moral solidarity, by the end of the nineteenth century, a second tier of
community had developed. This open community was heterogeneous and mi-
gratory, and lacked moral solidarity. Closed communities adjudicating tort
causes of action have recourse to shared morality regarding expected interper-
sonal behavior but open communities rarely do. As a descriptive matter, tort
doctrine implicitly encourages decision makers to toggle between a moral con-
ceptualization and an efficiency conceptualization depending on the tier of
community that is under construction in a particular dispute.
Making this implicit toggling capacity explicit, and refining its operation,
resolves the longstanding theoretical instability that has plagued tort. It legiti-
mizes both efficiency and morality as manifestations of tort law's broader pur-
pose. As important, clarifying the function of private personal injury law may
also lead to a more coherent analysis when tort law is in tension with federal
public law. Courts have been confounded by how to address tort verdicts that
clash with federal constitutional freedoms, statutes, or regulations. This diffi-
culty arises in part from theoretical angst over tort law's purpose. Once tort
outcomes are more accurately categorized as constructions of either closed
community or open community, courts will find it much easier to determine
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whether a particular verdict poses a threat to federal prerogatives on hot-button
issues like free speech and gun control. When sociological communities are en-
croaching on the singular mission of the state by devising quasi-regulatory na-
tional norms, courts can and should respond vigorously. But when tort law is
operating within its unique competency by constructing self-sustaining private
communities, public law overrides may do more harm than good.
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APPENDIX
Restatement (Second) of Torts Sections Referring to Community
Division One: Intentional Harms to Persons, Lands, and Chattels
46: Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress
48: Special Liability of Public Utility for Insults by Servants
192: Use of Public Highway
196: Public Necessity
Division Two: Negligence
283: Conduct of a Reasonable Man: The Standard
28 3A: Children
288: When Standard of Conduct Defined by Legislation or Regulation Will
Not Be Adopted
289: Recognizing Existence of Risk
290: What Actor Is Required To Know
292: Factors Considered in Determining Utility of Actor's Conduct
295A: Custom
299A: Undertaking in Profession or Trade
302: Risk of Direct or Indirect Harm
302A: Risk of Negligence or Recidessness of Others
328A: Burden of Proof
330: Licensee Defined
402A: Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Con-
sumer
416: Work Dangerous in Absence of Special Precautions
496D: Knowledge and Appreciation of Risk
Division Three: Strict Liability
504: Liability for Trespass by Livestock
509: Harm Done by Abnormally Dangerous Domestic Animals
520: Abnormally Dangerous Activities
Division Four: Misrepresentation
545A: Contributory Negligence
547: Recipient Relying on His Own Investigation
551: Liability for Nondisclosure
Division Five: Defamation
559: Defamatory Communication Defined
5 64 A: Defamation of a Group or Class
568: Libel and Slander Distinguished
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571: Slanderous Imputations of Criminal Conduct
58oA: Defamation of Public Official or Public Figure
58oB: Defamation of Private Person
595: Protection of Interest of Recipient or a Third Person




652D: Publicity Given to Private Life
65 2E: Publicity Placing Person in False Light
Division Seven: Unjustifiable Litigation
670: General Damages
Division Eight: Interference in Domestic Relations
686: Privilege of Parent or Other Person
Division Nine: Interference with Advantageous Economic Relations
767F: Factors in Determining Whether Interference Is Improper
771: Inducement To Influence Another's Business Policy
Division Ten: Invasions of Interests in Land Other than by Trespass
821B: Public Nuisance
821C: Who Can Recover for Public Nuisance
822: General Rule
826: Unreasonableness of Intentional Invasion
827: Gravity of Harm
828: Utility of Conduct - Factors Involved
85oA: Reasonableness of Use of Water
Division Eleven: Miscelleneous Rules
870: Liability for Intended Consequences - General Principle
Division Twelve: Defenses Applicable to All Torts Claims
892: Meaning of Consent
Division Thirteen: Remedies
930: Damages for Future Invasions
942: Interests of Third Persons and of the Public
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